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Comment
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EDUCATION AND STUDENT
ATHLETICS: A CASE FOR WHY TITLE IX SEXUAL
HARASSMENT JURISPRUDENCE SHOULD
DEVELOP INDEPENDENTLY OF
TITLE VII
Sexual harassment in education is a serious issue, and, according
to students in a recent poll, “routine” on college campuses.1  In a
study conducted in 2005 for the American Association of University
Women (AAUW), almost two-thirds of college students said they ex-
perienced some form of sexual harassment while in school.2  While
many of the incidents reported involved student-to-student harass-
ment, nearly one-fifth of students said that “faculty and staff often or
occasionally sexually harass students.”3  The problem is particularly sa-
lient in student athletic programs, where the physical nature of sports,
the emphasis on the athletes’ bodies, and the close contact between
coaches and players provide “unique opportunities for sexual harass-
ment.”4  One relatively recent study performed in Canada found that
one in five female athletes are sexually harassed or abused by their
coaches.5
These figures are especially troubling given the importance of ed-
ucation in nurturing individuals to become full and meaningful par-
ticipants in society.6  As Justice Warren noted in Brown v. Board of
Education:7
Copyright  2008 by Michael E. Buchwald.
1. See Susan Kinzie, Sexual Harassment Routine, College Students in Poll Say, WASH. POST,
Jan. 25, 2006, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/01/24/AR2006012401540.html (discussing the results of a recently released
national online survey conducted by the American Association of University Women).
2. CATHERINE HILL & ELENA SILVA, DRAWING THE LINE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAM-
PUS 2 (2005).
3. Id. at 20–21.
4. Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics’ Unique
Environments for Sexual Harassment Claims: Balancing the Realities of Athletics with Preventing
Potential Claims, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 173, 178–79 (2003).
5. Id. at 173.
6. See THE RIGHT TO BE EDUCATED 55 (Robert F. Drinan ed., 1968) (stating that the
denial of education “is tantamount to denial of human life itself” and that “[t]he right to
education is the foundation of all the rights of the person to live as a free and equal
member of his community”).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
672
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[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship.  To-
day it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cul-
tural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education.8
Sexual harassment threatens the educational mission because of its
potentially devastating effects on a student’s ability and willingness to
learn.9  Although sexual harassment is perceived differently by differ-
ent people and can elicit a variety of feelings and responses, some
common emotions include embarrassment, anger, fear, loss of confi-
dence, confusion, and disappointment.10  One female student, when
asked about being subject to harassment stated, “ ‘I felt violated and
could not focus on my classes.  I also felt limited in where I could go
on campus.’”11  One male student stated that sexual harassment “‘dis-
tract[s] from the working environment and make[s] it harder to con-
centrate because you become paranoid.’”12  For students who are
athletes, in addition to the emotional suffering it can elicit, sexual har-
assment can effectively ruin an athletic career.13  It can harm relation-
ships with teammates and coaches, and, in the case of athletes who
choose to leave their programs, limit their ability to participate in
other programs under National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) regulations.14
Although many people acknowledge the problem of sexual har-
assment, the term “sexual harassment” eludes a simple definition.15
This is because of the variety of circumstances in which sexual harass-
8. Id. at 493.
9. See Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV.
525, 540 (1987) (arguing that the academic environment is essential to the quality of the
education the student receives and that harassment in that environment diminishes the
benefit to the student).
10. HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at 28–29. R
11. Id. at 27.
12. Id.
13. Hogshead-Makar & Steinbach, supra note 4, at 173; see also Women’s Sports Foun- R
dation, Sexual Harassment—Sexual Harassment and Sexual Relationships Between
Coaches, Other Athletic Personnel and Athletes: The Foundation Position (Oct. 1, 2007),
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/coach/arti-
cle.html?record=575 (“In the context of athletic programs[, sexual harassment] lowers the
self-esteem and limits the ability of women and girls to develop their full potential in sports
and fitness activities.  It impairs the future capacity of its victims . . . to pursue employment
and leadership roles in athletics.”).
14. Hogshead-Makar & Steinbach, supra note 4, at 173–74. R
15. HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at 7. R
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ment may occur, and the numerous ways in which conduct may be
perceived.16  Therefore, in determining whether sexual harassment
has occurred, courts must look to the overall context in which the
harassment took place and cannot rely on any static definition of the
term.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that sexual har-
assment constitutes intentional discrimination and is prohibited in ed-
ucational institutions under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.17  Title IX itself does not mention sexual harassment, but in-
stead, states that “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”18  Without any statutory
guidance on the meaning of sexual harassment, the courts, in analyz-
ing and defining sexual harassment under Title IX, have relied heavily
on case law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,19 which prohibits
discrimination in the workplace.20  Although Title VII case law may be
useful as a guide in analyzing Title IX sexual harassment claims, its
repeated influence on Title IX jurisprudence has inhibited Title IX’s
effectiveness in confronting problems unique to the educational, and
particularly the student-athletic, environment.
This Comment critiques the courts’ reliance on Title VII case law
and posits three reasons why the application of Title VII standards and
precedent to Title IX sexual harassment cases is inadequate in con-
fronting sexual harassment in education.  First, whereas Title VII pro-
hibits discrimination in the workplace, Title IX is exclusively geared
towards protecting the educational environment, and the affirmative
language of Title IX suggests that courts should take a more proactive
approach in identifying and protecting students from sexually harass-
ing conduct than that taken under Title VII.21  Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination based on a variety of traits, including sex, with respect to
16. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“What is a laughing matter for one student may be offensive to
another and traumatic to yet another, especially in the campus community, which teems
with students and staff from a diversity of backgrounds and perspectives.”); Annmarie
Pinarski, Note, When Coaches “Cross the Line”: Hostile Athletic Environment Sexual Harassment,
52 RUTGERS L. REV. 911, 922 (2000) (averring that in the coach-athlete relationship, appro-
priate behavior for a coach may include inquiry into more private areas of an athlete’s life,
but that the boundaries of acceptable conduct would be different in other contexts).
17. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649–50
(1999).
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
19. See infra Part I.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
21. See infra Part II.A.
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employment terms, conditions, privileges, and opportunities.22  Al-
though Title IX also targets acts that discriminate, Title IX is focused
on inequalities based on sex and it affirmatively mandates that a per-
son not be denied participation in, or the benefits of, any educational
program or activity.23  Second, the educational environment warrants
a broader definition of sexual harassment than the work environment
because of the inherent trust and imbalance of power between teach-
ers and students.24  Although the framework used under Title VII is
helpful as a guide in analyzing Title IX cases, standards developed to
protect the adult workplace are not always appropriate for situations
involving children and young adults.25  Third, although Title VII pro-
vides that an employer may be liable for the actions of its employees
under a theory of respondeat superior, the Supreme Court has held that
an educational institution’s liability under Title IX must be based on
the institution’s own acts and not on agency principles.26  This limita-
tion allows Title IX to cover a wider range of activity without unduly
exposing educational institutions to Title IX liability.27
To bolster the argument that Title IX jurisprudence should de-
velop independently of Title VII, this Comment also identifies several
factors that are uniquely important to the educational setting that
courts should consider when analyzing sexual harassment claims
under Title IX.28  This Comment then uses Jennings v. University of
North Carolina29 to illustrate the inadequacies of the courts’ reliance
on Title VII30 and to apply the proposed factors to a specific factual
context.31
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n.11 (5th Cir. 1996)
(cautioning against “importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment con-
text into a situation involving children”).
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. See infra Part II.D.
29. 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Jennings is a recent sexual harassment case
that was brought against the coach of the women’s soccer team at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), which was recently settled.  Jane Stancill, Cash, Apology Settle
UNC-CH Soccer Suit, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 15, 2008, at A1, available at
http://www.newsobserver.com/sports/story/880965.html.
30. See infra Part I.D.
31. See infra Part II.D.4.
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I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE VII AND TITLE IX
JURISPRUDENCE
Legislation prohibiting sexual harassment derives from Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32  As under Title IX, the term “sexual
harassment” does not appear in the text of Title VII.33  Rather, Title
VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment,” or with respect to “employment opportuni-
ties,” “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.”34  Congress passed Title VII to purge inequality from
the workplace by requiring employers to make employment decisions
based on an individual’s qualifications, and not on one of the charac-
teristics mentioned in the statute.35  In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson,36 the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that sex-
ual harassment in the workplace constitutes discrimination on the ba-
sis of sex in violation of Title VII.37
To protect students in educational programs from discrimination
based on sex, Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972.  Title IX states, “No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”38  Title
IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
sought to end discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin in any program or activity that received federal funding.39  In
enacting Title IX, Congress sought to prevent federal resources from
being used to further sex-based discriminatory practices and to pro-
32. WILLIAM E. FOOTE & JANE GOODMAN-DELAHUNTY, EVALUATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
6 (2005).
33. Id. at 7.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
35. Kara L. Gross, Note, Toward Gender Equality and Understanding: Recognizing that Same-
Sex Sexual Harassment Is Sex Discrimination, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1996).
36. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
37. Id. at 63–64.  The Court reasoned that Title VII does not merely apply to “terms”
and “conditions” of employment in the narrow contractual sense, but rather extends to
“‘the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment.” Id. at
64 (quoting City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978)).
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).  Congress included colleges, universities, and other
post-secondary institutions within its definition of an education “program or activity.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-4a(2)(A).
39. Sasha Ransom, How Far Is Too Far?  Balancing Sexual Harassment Policies and Reasona-
bleness in the Primary and Secondary Classrooms, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 265, 277 (1997).
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vide protection from such discrimination to individuals attending edu-
cational institutions.40
Although Title IX was designed to supplement Title VI, because
Title VII also prohibits sexual discrimination, many courts have used
Title VII case law to analyze Title IX sexual harassment claims.41  Ini-
tially, the courts looked to Title VII to establish a private right of ac-
tion for damages under Title IX.42  In addition, the Supreme Court
has compared and contrasted Title VII and Title IX in defining the
contours of an educational institution’s exposure to liability for sexual
harassment committed by its employees and students.43  Most signifi-
cantly, the courts have looked to Title VII case law and Title VII’s “se-
vere or pervasive” standard to determine the type and amount of
conduct that constitutes actionable sexual harassment under Title
IX.44
A. The Influence of Title VII in Developing an Implied Private Right of
Action for Damages for Sexual Harassment Under Title IX
The courts initially looked to Title VII in attempting to construct
a private right of action for damages under Title IX. As under Title
VII, the Supreme Court has recognized that sexual harassment consti-
tutes discrimination under Title IX.45  However, by its terms alone,
Title IX does not afford a private right of action for money damages.46
Whereas Title VII contains an express cause of action for Title VII
violations,47 Title IX’s provisions include merely an administrative
remedy that conditions federal funding to recipients on their compli-
ance with Title IX.48  It was not until 1979, in Cannon v. University of
Chicago,49 that the Court recognized an individual’s right to sue for
discrimination under Title IX.50  In doing so, the Court established a
private right of action by implication.51
40. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 & n.36 (1979) (citing 118 CONG.
REC. 5806–07 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); 117 CONG. REC. 39252 (1971) (statement of
Rep. Mink)).
41. Ransom, supra note 39, at 277. R
42. See infra Part I.A.
43. See infra Part I.B.
44. See infra Part I.C.
45. E.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649–50
(1999).
46. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000) (enforcement provisions).
48. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 280–81, 283, 285–86.
49. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
50. Id. at 717.
51. Id.
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Although Cannon established that a plaintiff may enforce Title IX
through an implied private right of action, the Cannon Court consid-
ered neither what remedies would be available to a plaintiff who sued
under Title IX, nor whether sexual harassment was actionable under
Title IX.52  The Court first addressed these issues in Franklin v. Gwin-
nett County Public Schools,53 where the Court applied Title VII case law
to conclude that a monetary damages remedy existed for a private
cause of action for sexual harassment under Title IX.54  In Franklin, a
high school student, Franklin, brought a Title IX action against her
school district, alleging that Andrew Hill, a sports coach and teacher
who worked for the school district, subjected her to regular sexual
harassment.55  Franklin averred that although the school became
aware of the harassment, it failed to take any action to end the harass-
ment and actually tried to dissuade Franklin from filing charges.56  Al-
though the district court and the court of appeals found that Title IX
did not authorize damages, the Supreme Court reversed.57  The Court
found that the school district had a duty not to discriminate based on
sex and that the sexual harassment of a student by a teacher or coach,
like the sexual harassment of a subordinate by a supervisor in the Title
VII context, constituted discrimination on the basis of sex.58  The
Court reasoned that if damages were not available to Franklin, she
would be left without a remedy and, therefore, the Court remanded
the case for trial to determine liability and damages.59
52. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 65–66, 75 (1992).
53. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
54. Id. at 74–76.
55. Id. at 62–63.  Specifically, Franklin alleged that Hill called her at her home, asked
to meet with her socially, and inquired about her sexual relations with her boyfriend and
whether she would have sexual relations with an older man. Id. at 63.  Additionally, Frank-
lin alleged that on three occasions during eleventh grade, Hill took her into a private
office at the school and subjected her to coercive intercourse. Id.
56. Id. at 63–64.
57. Id. at 64, 76.
58. Id. at 75 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (a Title
VII case)).
59. Id. at 76. In general, the Supreme Court recognizes the presumption that federal
courts have the authority, absent clear direction from Congress to the contrary, to award
appropriate relief in a valid cause of action brought under a federal statute. See Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (“[I]t is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”).
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B. The Influence of Title VII in Establishing a Standard for Imputing
Liability Under Title IX to Educational Institutions for the Acts
of Their Subordinates
While the Supreme Court relied on Title VII in Franklin, in Gebser
v. Lago Vista Independent School District,60 the Court acknowledged dif-
ferences between the two statutes and substantially limited an individ-
ual’s private right of action under Title IX.61  In Gebser, a high school
student, Gebser, and her mother brought suit under Title IX against
the school district, alleging that a teacher sexually harassed Gebser
while she was a student at the high school.62  Gebser claimed that the
teacher directed sexually suggestive remarks at students in general,
and Gebser in particular, and that he also engaged in a sexual rela-
tionship with Gebser.63  Gebser never notified the school of the rela-
tionship because she was confused about how to react and wanted to
remain in the teacher’s classes.64  The school did not learn of the rela-
tionship until a police officer spotted Gebser and the teacher engag-
ing in sexual intercourse.65
Gebser, relying on the Court’s comparison of supervisor-
employee and teacher-student sexual harassment in Franklin, argued
that the Court should follow standards developed in Title VII cases to
find the school district liable under a theory of common law agency.66
The Court refused to apply agency principles, clarifying that it had
compared Franklin, a Title IX case, to Meritor, a Title VII case, only in
reference to the general principle that sexual harassment can consti-
60. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
61. Id. at 283–85 (finding that Title VII’s agency principles did not apply to Title IX,
and also that Title VII contained an express cause of action, but that Title IX contained
only an implied cause of action).
62. Id. at 277–79.
63. Id. at 277–78.  Specifically, Gebser alleged that the teacher initiated sexual contact
with her, kissing and fondling Gebser during a visit to her home. Id. at 278.  Gebser added
that this sexual conduct eventually led to frequent sexual intercourse, including during
school hours. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 281–82. The Court explained that to impute liability on employers for the
actions of their employees under Title VII, it has previously required application of com-
mon law principles of agency.  Id. at 282.  The Court has referred to Congress’s Title VII
definition of an “employer,” which includes any “agent” of an employer, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (2000), as support for its application of agency principles in this context.  Mer-
itor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).  Even under Title VII, however, an
employer will not always be held liable for the sexual harassment that its employees com-
mit against other employees. See id. (reasoning that while lack of notice to an employer of
sexual harassment by one of its employees will not automatically shield the employer from
liability, there are some limits on when an employer will be held liable for its employees’
actions).
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tute discrimination in violation of Title IX.67  The Court reasoned that
the application of agency principles in Title VII cases relied on a com-
ponent of Title VII not found in Title IX: whereas Title VII’s defini-
tion of an “employer” expressly includes the employer’s agents, Title
IX does not analogously reference the agents of an educational insti-
tution.68  As further support for this differential treatment, the Court
noted that although Title VII imposes an outright prohibition of dis-
crimination in the workplace, Title IX’s prohibition of sexual discrimi-
nation simply establishes a contractual condition between educational
institutions and federal funding agencies.69  The Court stated that,
under Title IX, courts must carefully evaluate the propriety of private
actions for damages because the express enforcement mechanism of
Title IX is a contractual condition on federal funding awards, not the
threat of monetary damages liability.70  Therefore, the Court empha-
sized the need for the school district to at least have notice of the
discriminatory conduct before being held liable for money damages.71
For these reasons, the Court held that a plaintiff could not recover
damages under Title IX unless an official with at least minimum au-
thority to establish corrective measures had actual knowledge of the
discriminatory acts and was deliberately indifferent in his or her
response.72
C. Sexual Harassment Defined: The Development of the “Severe or
Pervasive” Standard of Sexual Harassment Under Title VII
and Its Influence on Title IX
Title VII has been most influential on Title IX jurisprudence in
the context of determining the type and level of conduct that consti-
tutes actionable sexual harassment.  By not mentioning the term “sex-
ual harassment” in Title VII or in Title IX,73 Congress implicitly left it
to the courts to establish the term’s parameters.74  As such, the courts
67. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283, 292–93.
68. Id. at 283.
69. Id. at 286–88.  In other words, the Court reasoned that Congress passed Title IX,
unlike Title VII, pursuant to its power under the Spending Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 1, and that Title IX thus “condition[s] an offer of federal funding on a promise by the
recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the Gov-
ernment and the recipient of funds.” Id. at 286–87.
70. Id. at 287.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 290.  In other words, the Court made clear that the recipient could not be
held liable merely on theories of respondeat superior or constructive notice. Id. at 287–88.
73. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
74. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650–51
(1999) (explaining that the language of Title IX provides “content” to the discrimination
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have recognized two main forms of sexual harassment as discrimina-
tion under these statutes: (1) quid pro quo sexual harassment; and (2)
hostile environment sexual harassment.75 Quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment, under Title VII for example, occurs when “submission to [sex-
ual] conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition
of an individual’s employment, [or when] submission to or rejection
of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual.”76  Hostile environment sexual
harassment occurs when sexually harassing conduct “has the purpose
or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work per-
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working en-
vironment.”77  This Comment will focus primarily on the hostile
environment form of sexual harassment because this is where Title VII
cases have had their greatest influence on Title IX.
In order for a hostile environment claim to be actionable under
Title VII, the Supreme Court requires that conduct be sufficiently “se-
vere or pervasive” so as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employ-
ment and create an abusive work environment.78  To be “severe or
pervasive,” Title VII requires that the conduct be not merely offensive,
but so severe as to be both subjectively and objectively hostile and
discriminating.79  In the Title IX context, the Supreme Court has ap-
plied Title VII’s “severe or pervasive” standard only in a student-to-
student sexual harassment case.80  While the Supreme Court has yet to
apply the “severe or pervasive” standard to adult-to-student sexual har-
assment cases, lower courts have done so in both teacher-to-student
and coach-to-player sexual harassment cases.81
that it prohibits and that courts should analyze harassment using a totality of the circum-
stances approach).
75. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1998) (noting the two
types of harassment under Title VII); Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 263 F.3d 504, 510 (6th
Cir. 2001) (referring to the two types of harassment under Title IX).
76. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)–(2) (2007); see also Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 25
(1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that quid pro quo harassment “occurs most often when some
benefit or adverse action, such as change in salary at work or a grade in school, is made to
depend on providing sexual favors to someone in authority”).
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986) (describing the regulation’s definition of hostile environment sexual harassment).
78. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
79. See infra Part I.C.1.
80. See infra Part I.C.2.
81. See infra Part I.C.3–4.
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1. Factors Considered in Title VII Cases when Applying the “Severe or
Pervasive” Standard
To be “severe or pervasive” under Title VII, the Supreme Court
requires that the alleged harassment create an environment that is
both objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive.82  The Court rea-
sons that Title VII targets discrimination, but does not function as a
“general civility code” for the workplace.83  To determine whether
conduct in a particular context is sufficient to create a hostile or abu-
sive environment, courts must look to the “constellation of surround-
ing circumstances, expectations, and relationships.”84  Specifically,
courts have considered the following nonexclusive list of factors: (1)
whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or
merely an offensive utterance; (2) the presence or absence of direct
sexual propositioning or inappropriate touching; (3) whether the
conduct is sexually neutral or ambiguous; and (4) the length of time
during which, and the frequency with which, incidents have oc-
curred.85  However, Title VII does not require that the conduct be so
severe as to cause psychological injury.86
Conduct such as “simple teasing” and “offhand comments” will
not be actionable under Title VII, where it is not physically threaten-
ing or humiliating.87  For example, in Greene v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc.,88 the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that the
plaintiff’s exposure to pornographic magazines, co-workers’ sexist
jokes, and supervisors’ demeaning comments about female employees
did not create a hostile environment.89  For example, one of the sexist
jokes to which the plaintiff was exposed went: “ ‘How many men does
it take to open a beer?  None.  It should be opened by the time she
brings it.’”90  The court reasoned that such conduct was not objec-
tively hostile, absent aggravating factors.91  The court proposed the
82. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22.
83. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
84. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82.
85. See infra notes 87–134 and accompanying text. R
86. See infra notes 102–108 and accompanying text. R
87. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88; see also, e.g., Byers v. HSBC Fin. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 2d
424, 435 (E.D. Va. 2006) (finding that a supervisor’s conduct was not sufficiently severe or
pervasive when she asked an employee if he was faithful to his girlfriend and invited him to
places outside of work, because these remarks merely constituted the type of teasing and
offhand comments described above).
88. 371 F. Supp. 2d 759 (D. Md. 2005), aff’d per curiam, 170 Fed. Appx. 853 (4th Cir.
2006).
89. Id. at 761, 763–64.
90. Id. at 761.
91. Id. at 763–64.
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following as examples of aggravating factors: an audience for the
plaintiff’s embarrassment; co-workers’ lengthy conversations about in-
appropriate materials; and physical threats and humiliation.92  The
court added that although the conduct that the plaintiff endured was
“crude,” it did not, without such aggravating circumstances, create
“the hellish environment against which Title VII protects.”93
The absence of direct sexual propositioning or inappropriate
touching may also undermine a hostile environment claim.94  In Hart-
sell v. Duplex Products, Inc.,95 an employee, Hartsell, brought suit under
Title VII against her former employer, Duplex, alleging that three
other employees of the company subjected her to continual sexual
harassment.96  Particularly, Hartsell claimed that she was repeatedly
subjected to sexually degrading comments.97  The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, found the comments in-
sufficient to satisfy the “severe or pervasive” requirement.98  The court
pointed out that Hartsell was never “inappropriately touched, proposi-
tioned, flirted with, taunted, or even ogled.”99  Additionally, the court
noted that the environment at Duplex was “relaxed and informal” and
that Hartsell took part in the office banter.100  Although the court
stated that the “severe or pervasive” test was a question of fact, the
court upheld summary judgment, finding that the conduct was “so
trivial, so isolated, and so far from the paradigmatic case of sexual
harassment” that it could not consider it actionable.101
92. Id. at 764.
93. Id. at 763–64.
94. See Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 772–73 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding
conduct merely unpleasant and not actionable absent allegations of inappropriate touch-
ing and propositioning).
95. 123 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 1997).
96. Id. at 768, 770.
97. Id. at 768–69. For instance, Hartsell alleged that within two weeks of starting at
Duplex, the other employees exclaimed, “‘We’ve made every female in this office cry like a
baby,’” and threatened to do the same to Hartsell. Id. at 768.  On another occasion, one of
the employees inquired, in front of Hartsell and upon seeing a buxom woman in a maga-
zine wearing a revealing shirt, “ ‘[W]hy don’t we have sales assistants that look like that[?]’”
Id. (alteration in original).  Additionally, one of the employees once cried out to Hartsell,
“ ‘[W]hy don’t you go home and fetch your husband’s slippers like a good little wife . . . .’”
Id. at 769 (alteration in original).
98. Id. at 772.
99. Id. at 773.
100. Id. at 769.  For instance, the court noted that Hartsell herself had referred to mas-
turbation. Id. at 773.
101. Id. at 773–74.
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However, Title VII does not require that the alleged conduct be
so severe as to cause psychological injury.102 In Harris v. Forklift Sys-
tems, Inc.,103 Harris brought suit against her former employer under
Title VII, alleging that Charles Hardy, the president of the company,
created an abusive work environment by continually insulting her be-
cause of her gender and by directing sexual innuendos at her.104  The
district court rejected Harris’s claim and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.105
The district court held that although Hardy’s comments could have
offended a reasonable person in Harris’s situation, they were not so
severe as to “‘seriously affect [Harris’] psychological well-being’” or to
cause her injury.106  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title
VII does not require a showing of psychological injury and that a
plaintiff does not have to experience a nervous breakdown before Ti-
tle VII applies.107  Instead, the Court held that as long as a plaintiff
reasonably perceives the workplace to be hostile or abusive, a showing
of psychological injury is unnecessary.108
A court may be reluctant to find conduct actionable under Title
VII where it is sexually neutral or ambiguous, even where a plaintiff
outwardly objects to the conduct.109  In Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas and
Electric Co.,110 a case of same-sex sexual harassment by a male supervi-
sor, the Fourth Circuit found that a supervisor’s conduct was not suffi-
ciently “severe or pervasive” to be actionable.111  Hopkins alleged that,
over a seven-year period, his male supervisor frequently subjected him
to inappropriate sexual comments and jokes, including about his ap-
pearance and clothing.112  Hopkins also claimed that the supervisor
102. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (holding that conduct violates
Title VII if it creates an environment that is and would reasonably be perceived as hostile
or abusive, regardless of whether the conduct caused actual psychological harm).
103. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
104. Id. at 19.  Specifically, Hardy made comments such as, “ ‘You’re a woman, what do
you know[?]’ and ‘We need a man as the rental manager.’” Id.  On another occasion, in
front of other employees, Hardy allegedly recommended that he and Harris visit a Holiday
Inn to negotiate her raise, and once while Harris was arranging a deal he exclaimed,
“‘What did you do, promise the guy . . . some [sex] Saturday night?’” Id. (alteration in
original). He also referred to her on at least one occasion as a “‘dumb ass woman.’” Id.
105. Id. at 19–20.
106. Id. at 20 (alteration in original).
107. Id. at 22–23.
108. Id. at 22.
109. See Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 747–48, 753–54 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that sexually neutral or ambiguous conduct was not actionable and highlighting
the absence of overt sexual propositioning).
110. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
111. Id. at 747, 753–54.
112. Id. at 747–48.  During a discussion with a vendor and Hopkins about a recent plane
crash, the supervisor stated that to survive a plane crash in the water, he would “‘find a
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directed physically harassing conduct at him, including bumping into
him, and positioning a magnifying glass over Hopkins’s crotch and
asking “‘Where is it?’”113  The court, however, reasoned that the con-
duct was “sexually neutral or, at most, ambiguous” because the super-
visor never made any overt sexual proposition to Hopkins or touched
him sexually.114  Additionally, the court maintained that many of the
alleged incidents took place in group settings and that Hopkins only
subjectively believed that the conduct was directed just at him.115  Al-
though the court expressed its disapproval of the supervisor’s offen-
sive and provocative conduct, it emphasized that Title VII was not
created “‘to purge the workplace of vulgarity’” and that the conduct
was akin to that of other cases in which the Fourth Circuit had found
conduct insufficiently “severe or pervasive.”116
Courts evaluating hostile environment claims also consider the
length of time and the frequency with which the incidents oc-
curred.117  In Baskerville v. Culligan International Co.,118 the Seventh
Circuit found that a “handful” of comments by a male manager
spread out over a seven-month period did not amount to actionable
sexual harassment of his female secretary.119  The secretary claimed
that her manager referred to her as “ ‘pretty girl,’” and sometimes
made grunting sounds like “‘um um um’” when she turned to exit his
office.120  The secretary further averred that once at a company Christ-
mas party, her manager said that he did not want to “‘lose control’”
with all of the attractive women around, and that on another occasion
dead man and cut off his penis and breathe through that.’” Id. at 747.  Another time, the
supervisor allegedly wrote the word “Alternative” before the company name “Lifestyles” on
a piece of mail addressed to Hopkins. Id.
113. Id. at 747–48.  Hopkins further alleged that the supervisor regularly came into the
men’s bathroom when Hopkins was there alone and that he once, after acting as if he had
locked the door, said, “ ‘Ah, alone at last.’” Id. at 747. The supervisor was also the only
man who tried to kiss Hopkins at his wedding and, one time, attempted to force himself
into a single-person revolving door with Hopkins. Id. at 747–48.
114. Id. at 753.
115. Id. at 754.
116. Id. at 753–54 (quoting Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.
1995)).
117. See Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430–31 (considering these timing factors); see also Hopkins,
77 F.3d at 753 (reasoning that the supervisor’s conduct did not likely have a significant
emotional impact on the employee because it occurred intermittently over a seven-year
period).
118. 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995).
119. Id. at 430–31.
120. Id. at 430. The secretary also alleged that the manager once exclaimed that his
office became “hot” when she walked in. Id. On another occasion, when an announce-
ment came over the public-address system at the office, he told her it meant that “‘All
pretty girls run around naked.’” Id.
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he made a gesture to her that referred to masturbation.121  In finding
that the manager’s behavior was “‘merely vulgar and mildly offen-
sive,’” rather than “hostile or deeply repugnant,” the court reasoned
that the infrequency of the conduct made it unlikely that it would
have a significant emotional impact.122  The court contrasted the com-
ments in Baskerville with a “concentrated or incessant barrage.”123
As explained previously, the factors listed above often overlap
and interact with each other.  As such, the Baskerville court, in finding
that the manager’s conduct had not made the secretary’s work envi-
ronment hostile, further noted that the manager had not proposi-
tioned the plaintiff, threatened her, or exposed himself to her.124
The court added that the manager’s comments were of the sort found
on primetime television and that his reference to masturbation merely
showed that the manager’s sense of humor had not progressed passed
that of an adolescent.125
Additionally, the factors are non-exclusive, thus, the absence of
one of the factors is not always dispositive.  For example, a work envi-
ronment may be abusive or hostile even in the absence of sexual ad-
vances or propositions.126  In Smith v. First Union National Bank,127
Smith brought suit under Title VII against her former employer claim-
ing that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, Ronald Scog-
gins.128  Smith claimed that on more than thirty occasions, Scoggins
stated that he preferred a male in Smith’s position because men are
“‘natural leaders’” and women are “‘too emotional to handle a mana-
gerial role.’”129  Additionally, Scoggins demeaned women by making
comments such as: “women should be barefoot and pregnant,” and a
121. Id.  The manager allegedly made the reference to masturbation after the secretary
asked if he had purchased his wife a Valentine’s Day card. Id. The manager responded in
the negative, but said that he should have because his wife was still living apart from him,
and it was lonely in his hotel room. Id. At that point, the manager allegedly gazed down at
his hand “ostentatiously.” Id.
122. Id. at 431 (quoting Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d
1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 1994)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Although the court conceded that mildly offensive remarks must be viewed in
context, and that such remarks may take on a more “sinister” quality “when delivered in
the suggestive isolation of a hotel room,” the court noted that the secretary and manager
had never been alone while away from the office. Id.
126. See Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 2000) (determining
that an environment consumed by intimidation, ridicule, and demeaning conduct can be
as hostile as one with unwelcome sexual advances).
127. 202 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2000).
128. Id. at 238, 241.
129. Id. at 238.
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woman needs to “‘spread her legs’” to advance.130  At one point,
Scoggins allegedly got in Smith’s face and told her that he could “‘see
why a man would slit a woman’s throat.’”131  The Fourth Circuit found
that even though Scoggins never inappropriately touched, proposi-
tioned, or ogled Smith, Scoggins’s conduct, if proven, violated Title
VII.132  The court distinguished Hartsell, noting that whereas Hartsell
had been exposed to four isolated and non-threatening comments,
Scoggins made his remarks against Smith regularly, and they even in-
cluded a physical threat.133  The court held that an environment that
is infiltrated by intimidation, ridicule, and the mean-spirited demean-
ing of women could be as hostile or abusive as one that involved un-
welcome sexual propositioning.134
2. The Supreme Court Has Applied the Title VII “Severe or
Pervasive” Standard in the Title IX Student-to-Student
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Context
The Supreme Court has imported Title VII’s “severe or pervasive”
standard into the Title IX context, but only in a case of student-to-
student sexual harassment.  Although Franklin and Gebser established a
damages remedy and a standard for imputing liability to funding re-
cipients in Title IX cases,135 neither addressed the standard for evalu-
ating when conduct rises to the level of actionable sexual harassment
under Title IX.  To date, the only Supreme Court case to address this
standard is Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
tion,136 a student-to-student sexual harassment case.  In Davis, the
mother of a fifth-grade student sued the school board and school offi-
cials for failing to prevent or properly respond to the continued sex-
ual harassment of her daughter, LaShonda, by one of LaShonda’s
classmates.137  The complaint averred that as a result of the harass-
130. Id. at 239.  When a woman at the office was upset, Scoggins allegedly would com-
ment to Smith that the woman needed a “‘good banging,’” or that she was menstruating.
Id. at 238.  Scoggins also stated that he would have liked to have been a woman so he could
“‘whore his way through life.’” Id. at 239.
131. Id. at 239.
132. Id. at 242–43. The court also noted that nearly all of Scoggins’s harassing remarks
contained express and demeaning references to women, and that his conduct was clearly
unwelcome, given Smith’s repeated objections to the comments. Id. at 242.
133. Id. at 242–43.
134. Id. at 242.
135. See supra Part I.A–B.
136. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
137. Id. at 632–35.  The mother claimed that the classmate, over a five-month period,
sexually harassed LaShonda by attempting to touch her breasts and genital area, making
obscene comments such as “‘I want to get in bed with you’ and ‘I want to feel your boobs,’”
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ment, LaShonda’s grades dropped and LaShonda at one point con-
templated suicide.138  Additionally, the complaint alleged that
although LaShonda reported this conduct to her teachers and her
mother also reported it to the school principal, the school took no
disciplinary action and made no effort to separate the harasser from
LaShonda.139  The lower courts dismissed the claim, holding that Title
IX provided no basis for liability absent an allegation that the school
board or an employee of the school participated in the sexual harass-
ment of the student.140  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it
could not find beyond a doubt that the plaintiff’s claim would not
entitle her to relief.141  The Court noted that although Title IX is fo-
cused on the educational institution’s own behavior, a school may be
found liable for damages under Title IX for student-to-student sexual
harassment in “certain limited circumstances.”142
In Davis, the primary issue did not concern what sort of conduct
Title IX proscribed, but rather, whether an educational institution
could be liable under Title IX for failing to respond to student-on-
student harassment.143 The Court reasoned that even if the funding
recipient did not directly participate in the harassment, the recipient
could still be liable in damages for sexual harassment in circumstances
where “the recipient exercise[d] substantial control over both the har-
asser and the context in which the known harassment occur[red].”144
However, the Court cautioned that “schools are unlike the adult work-
place and that children may regularly interact in a manner that would
be unacceptable among adults.”145  The Court, therefore, reasoned
that the simple teasing, banter, and name-calling that often occur
among school children, even if upsetting to the children, would not
support a cause of action for damages under Title IX.146  Instead, the
Court held that in student-to-student sexual harassment cases, dam-
and allegedly positioning a door stop in his pants and acting in a sexually suggestive man-
ner. Id. at 633–34.
138. Id. at 634.
139. Id. at 634–35.
140. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1392
(11th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Aurelia D. ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
141. Davis, 526 U.S. at 654.
142. Id. at 642–43.
143. Id. at 639.
144. Id. at 644–45.  Although the Court conceded that these elements would be most
easily met when the harasser was an agent of the recipient, the Court reiterated that it had
not injected an agency requirement into Title IX jurisprudence. Id. at 645–46.
145. Id. at 651.
146. Id. at 651–52.
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ages are only available when the conduct is “so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive” so as to deny its victims equal access to educa-
tion.147  Ultimately, the Court found that the plaintiff had adequately
alleged that her harasser’s conduct was “severe, pervasive, and objec-
tively offensive,” and that the school did not try to investigate or put
an end to the conduct.148
3. Lower Courts Have Applied the Title VII “Severe or Pervasive”
Standard in Title IX Teacher-to-Student Hostile Environment
Cases
Although the Supreme Court has yet to do so, federal circuit
courts have applied Title VII standards to hostile educational environ-
ment cases involving teacher-to-student sexual harassment.149  These
courts require a plaintiff in a Title IX hostile environment sexual har-
assment case to show:
(i) that he/she is a member of a protected class; (ii) that he/
she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (iii) that
the harassment was based upon sex; (iv) that the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the condi-
tions of plaintiff’s education and create an abusive educa-
tional environment; and (v) that some basis for employer
liability has been established.150
Courts have looked to Title VII cases to assess the severity and perva-
siveness of the harassers’ conduct.151  In Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer
Productions, Inc.,152 two high school students and their parents sued
school officials, among other defendants, after they were compelled
to attend a sexually explicit AIDS awareness assembly conducted at
their public high school.153  The students claimed that mandatory at-
tendance at the assembly created a hostile environment in violation of
Title IX.154  The court noted that relevant Title IX case law was “rela-
tively sparse” and, based on the Supreme Court’s use of Title VII in
Franklin, applied Title VII case law to assess the allegedly harassing
147. Id. at 652.
148. Id. at 653–54.
149. See, e.g., Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 744 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that
42 U.S.C. § 1983 hostile educational environment claims are resolved using Title VII hos-
tile environment jurisprudence); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529,
540 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying Title VII cases to a Title IX hostile environment claim).
150. E.g., Brown, 68 F.3d at 540.
151. See, e.g., id.
152. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
153. Id. at 529–30.
154. Id.
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conduct.155  Relying on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,156 another Title
VII case, and substituting the term “educational environment” for
“workplace,” the court held that Title IX is violated “‘[w]hen the [ed-
ucational environment] is permeated with discriminatory intimida-
tion, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive . . .
environment.’”157  The court also highlighted the same factors de-
scribed in Harris to evaluate whether the conduct in Brown created a
hostile or abusive environment.158  Ultimately, the court found that
the students’ allegations, viewed in light of the Harris factors, were
insufficient to establish an objectively hostile or abusive educational
environment.159
The First Circuit further enmeshed Title VII and Title IX in Wills
v. Brown University,160 by treating Title IX and Title VII hostile environ-
ment claims as one and the same.161  In Wills, a student brought a
Title IX suit against Brown University after one of its former profes-
sors allegedly inappropriately touched the student.162 Specifically, the
student alleged that during a visit to the teacher’s office for assistance
with class material, the teacher placed his hand under the student’s
shirt, rubbed her stomach and touched her breasts.163  The student
claimed that the university subjected her to a hostile environment be-
cause she was forced to endure the continued presence of her har-
155. Id. at 540 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 73–75
(1992); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1986)).
156. 510 U.S. 17 (1993); see supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text. R
157. Brown, 68 F.3d at 540 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Harris,
510 U.S. at 21).
158. Id.  The factors that the Brown court listed include: (1) the frequency of the con-
duct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct was physically threatening or
humiliating, rather than merely offensive; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably hin-
dered work performance. Id.
159. Id. at 540–41.  The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ mandatory attendance at the
AIDS awareness program was only a one-time exposure and that the comments and mate-
rial from the program were not objectively offensive in the context of the program. Id. at
541. The court strongly considered the introductory remarks before the assembly, which
emphasized that the AIDS program was a unique and unusual way of disseminating the
message about AIDS to high school students. Id. The court stated that this introduction
should have indicated to a reasonable person that the “allegedly vulgar sexual commen-
tary” was meant to reach out to and educate students, instead of creating a hostile environ-
ment for them. Id.
160. 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999).
161. See id. at 26 (stating that “a hostile environment claim requires the victim to have
been subjected to harassment severe enough to compromise the victim’s employment or
educational opportunities”).
162. Id. at 23.
163. Id.
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asser, as the teacher remained on the faculty after the incident.164
The student further alleged that the university had notice of the inci-
dent and of the teacher’s prior sexual misconduct, and that the uni-
versity failed to take action to prevent harm to her and other
students.165  In determining whether the continued presence of the
harasser could create a hostile environment, the court looked to Title
VII principles.166  The court stated that although the Supreme Court,
in Gebser, refused to apply Title VII agency principles to Title IX sexual
harassment cases, Title VII case law was still informative when evaluat-
ing “the nature of sex discrimination under Title IX.”167  In so doing,
the court relied on the Supreme Court’s reference to Meritor in its
discussion of sexual harassment in Franklin,168 where the Court analo-
gized the sexual harassment of a student by a teacher to the sexual
harassment of a subordinate by a supervisor.169  The court ultimately
held that a reasonable jury could find that the teacher’s continued
presence on the faculty created a hostile environment for the student
and remanded the case for trial.170
The Eighth Circuit has also relied on Title VII precedent to deter-
mine whether conduct is sufficiently severe as to create a hostile edu-
cational environment.171  In Lam v. Curators of the University of Missouri,
at Kansas City Dental School,172 a dental student, Lam, brought a Title
IX action against her dental school claiming that she was exposed to a
hostile educational environment after her clinical instructor forcibly
kissed her and after instructors at the university showed her an in-
structional videotape that contained sexual innuendos.173  According
to Lam, the assault by her clinical instructor brought back memories
of prior sexual abuse, and the instructional video was offensive.174
The court, however, found that Lam had not established a sufficient
connection between the assault by her clinical instructor and her edu-
164. Id. at 27, 38.  Specifically, the court looked to Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 883
(9th Cir. 1991), a Title VII case where the court held that a hostile work environment
could exist because of the mere presence of an employee who had perpetrated especially
severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Id. at 38.
165. Id. at 26.
166. Id. at 38.
167. Id. at 38 n.8.
168. Id.
169. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (citing Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
170. Wills, 184 F.3d at 39, 42.
171. Lam v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., at Kan. City Dental Sch., 122 F.3d 654, 656–57
(8th Cir. 1997).
172. 122 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 1997).
173. Id. at 655.
174. Id.
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cational program.175  Therefore, on Lam’s hostile environment claim
against the university, the court only considered Lam’s exposure to
the offensive videotape.176  In finding that Lam’s single exposure to a
distasteful video was not sufficiently “severe or pervasive,” the court
looked to Title VII and compared Lam’s situation to an employee’s
single exposure to offensive behavior by a supervisor.177  Thus, the
court found that Lam failed to establish a prima facie case of sexual
harassment under Title IX.178
4. Courts Have Also Applied Title VII Case Law to Title IX Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims by Student-Athletes
Resulting from Conduct by Their Coaches
Although the Supreme Court has held that sexual harassment of
a student by a teacher-coach is actionable under Title IX,179 a majority
of the Title IX cases involving student-athletes have been suits by wo-
men to gain equal treatment, funding, and access to athletic opportu-
nities and programs.180  Thus, there have been very few reported cases
involving Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment claims
against coaches.  Those that do exist have used Title VII standards and
cases to guide their analyses.181
175. Id. at 656.  Specifically, the assault took place off school grounds after Lam’s in-
structor invited her to work in his private clinic.  Id. at 655–56.  The court reasoned that,
because the assault did not happen in school or during a school-sponsored activity, such
conduct could not serve as a predicate for the university’s liability under Title IX. Id. at
656.  This case was decided one year before the decision in Gebser, which established the
current standard that an institution, to be liable, must have knowledge of and act with
deliberate indifference to the sexual harassment of a student by one of its employees. See
supra note 72 and accompanying text. R
176. Lam, 122 F.3d at 656.
177. Id. at 656–57.
178. Id. at 657.
179. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 63, 65 (1992).
180. See, e.g., Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1993) (former members of
the women’s ice hockey team brought suit claiming that a university’s failure to upgrade
the team to varsity status violated Title IX); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 335 (3d
Cir. 1993) (female athletes brought suit to challenge a university’s decision to cancel the
women’s gymnastics and field hockey programs); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517,
521–22 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (actual and potential female athletes brought a class action suit
alleging unlawful sex discrimination in a university’s intercollegiate athletic program).
181. See Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 912, 915 (S.D. Ohio 1998),
aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the elements necessary to prove a Title VII
case apply equally in Title IX hostile environment cases against coaches); Morrison v. N.
Essex Cmty. Coll., 780 N.E.2d 132, 143 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that the determina-
tion of whether a hostile environment exists under Title IX depends on analogous Title
VII principles).
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For example, in Klemencic v. Ohio State University,182 Klemencic, a
former member of Ohio State University’s women’s track and cross
country teams, brought Title IX claims against Ohio State alleging
that her coach subjected her to both quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment.183  Specifically, Klemencic alleged that her
coach harassed her by making a sexual proposition to her over the
phone.184  This came about amidst a pattern of involvement by her
coach in Klemencic’s personal life.185  After Klemencic refused those
propositions, the coach allegedly confronted her outside of her apart-
ment.186  After she again refused his advances, the coach prevented
her from training with the team and functioning as the team’s assis-
tant coach.187
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio found that although Klemencic had stated a subjective claim of
psychological harm, the alleged conduct was not “severe or pervasive”
enough to create an objectively hostile educational environment.188
The court noted that although the coach’s requests to go out on a
date with Klemencic may have been inappropriate and personally of-
fensive to Klemencic, the coach’s conduct was “not the stuff of which a
hostile environment is made.”189  The court found this to be true
based on the conduct that other courts had previously found not to be
actionable in a variety of Title VII cases.190  The court also rejected the
quid pro quo claim, holding that, under Gebser, no official with the au-
182. 10 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001).
183. Id. at 912, 914.
184. Id. at 916.  During the telephone conversation between Klemencic and her coach,
the coach purportedly told Klemencic that he considered her to be his best friend and
asked her to go out with him. Id. The coach then allegedly explained that he could get a
prostitute, but that he would rather be with someone he cared about. Id.
185. Id.  Klemencic alleged that her coach drove her home from practice, called her at
home, offered to allow her to stay at his apartment when her lease was about to expire, and
interfered with her and her boyfriend’s relationship. Id. Additionally, on one occasion,
the coach sent her a sexually explicit image from a magazine. Id. at 914.
186. Id. at 913.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 916.
189. Id. at 917.
190. Id. at 917–18 (citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that verbal conduct that occurred over a seven-month period did not rise
to the level of sexual harassment under Title VII); Koelsch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d
705, 706–07 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a supervisor who caressed an employee’s leg,
grabbed her buttocks, told her that she was attractive, and asked her out on dates had not
engaged in actionable sexual harassment); Saxton v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 10
F.3d 526, 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a supervisor’s inappropriate kissing and
repeated touching were not actionable sexual harassment)).
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thority to enact corrective measures had been deliberately indifferent
upon learning of the coach’s conduct.191
Similarly, in Morrison v. Northern Essex Community College,192 the
Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Essex analogized sexual harassment
claims in the employment context to claims brought in the educa-
tional context.193  In Morrison, however, the court found that the col-
lege athletic director-coach’s conduct created a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether a hostile educational environment existed
for two female plaintiffs.194  The plaintiffs alleged that the coach, Mr.
Hess, gave alcohol to students, requested sexual favors from female
students, and engaged in sexual intercourse with other students.195  In
response to a complaint from a female athlete in the late 1980s, the
college conducted an investigation into the activities of Mr. Hess.196
The investigation revealed that the student athletes felt “beholden” to
Mr. Hess because of his ability to obtain scholarships for them and
give them playing time.197  The investigation also showed that during
lunches and walks with the female athletes, Mr. Hess inquired about
intimate details of the athletes’ lives, such as their relationships with
boyfriends and whether they had received abortions.198  As a result of
Mr. Hess’s conduct, many female athletes left the team or withdrew
from college completely to avoid him.199  Although some former stu-
dents agreed to testify against Mr. Hess, others who had had sexual
relations with him would not because they thought that the conduct
had been consensual, or they were too intimidated to testify.200
With regard to the conduct directed at the plaintiffs, members of
the women’s basketball team in the early 1990s, they alleged that Mr.
Hess inquired into their personal lives, asked for massages, made inap-
propriate comments, and prevented them from receiving playing time
191. Id. at 918.
192. 780 N.E.2d 132 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
193. Id. at 143.
194. Id. at 134, 136, 142–43.  In Morrison, the plaintiffs brought a state hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claim under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151C, §§ 1(e) and 2(g)
(West 2004), as well as a federal claim under Title IX. Id. at 134.
195. Id. at 136–37.  Some of the alleged conduct occurred in the 1980s, before the plain-
tiffs began attending the community college in the early 1990s. Id. at 136–38.
196. Id. at 136.  These activities included pulling down his female athletes’ shorts, pat-
ting their buttocks, undoing their bra straps, walking in on female students in the bath-
room, making them drink liquor out of his mouth, kissing them, engaging in sexual
intercourse with female students, and discussing his vasectomy with them. Id. at 137.
197. Id. at 137.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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when they avoided or rejected him.201  For example, he made com-
ments to one of the plaintiffs, such as “ ‘I bet . . . you probably got laid
in Dallas.’”202  To the other plaintiff, he said, “ ‘I want a massage but
don’t worry, we don’t have to do it.  I just want it in your under-
wear.’”203  He also asked about whether they had orgasms, and met
them each privately for lunch in a condominium that he owned,
where he massaged the breasts of one of the plaintiffs.204
The court found that the repetitive and continued sexual harass-
ment to which the students had been subjected was “humiliating and
degrading” and “sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile educa-
tional environment.”205  The court noted that a student exposed to
such repeated conduct might not realize the enormity of the discrimi-
nation and harassment until it had occurred for an extended time.206
In finding that a hostile educational environment existed, the court
relied on principles taken from Title VII.207  As in Brown v. Hot, Sexy
and Safer Productions, Inc.,208 the court turned to the list of factors laid
out in Harris.209  Additionally, the court cited a number of other Title
VII cases in establishing the standard for sexual harassment.210
Although federal circuit courts have used Title VII jurisprudence
to analyze hostile environment claims under Title IX, courts have,
nevertheless, underscored the “fact-specific and circumstance-driven
nature” of hostile environment cases.211  The Supreme Court has em-
phasized using a totality of the circumstances approach to determine
when conduct creates a hostile environment.212  The “‘constellation
of surrounding circumstances’” that must be considered under Title
IX includes, but is not limited to, the relationship and relative ages of
201. Id. at 137–39.
202. Id. at 138.
203. Id. at 139.
204. Id. at 138–39.
205. Id. at 142.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 143.
208. 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995); see supra notes 149–159 and accompanying text. R
209. Morrison, 780 N.E.2d at 143.  See supra note 158 and accompanying text for a list of R
the factors.
210. See Morrison, 780 N.E.2d at 143 (citing Gorski v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 466,
474 (1st Cir. 2002); Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2002)).
211. Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 746 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Gabrielle M. v.
Park Forest-Chi. Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003) (also noting
the “fact-specific” nature of Title IX analysis).
212. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (stating, in a Title VII
case,  that “whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances”).
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the harasser and the victims, and the number of persons involved.213
In addition, courts have emphasized viewing conduct in the aggre-
gate, rather than focusing on individual allegations and occur-
rences.214  Accordingly, courts have cautioned against using prior case
law to attempt to create a baseline for what constitutes actionable sex-
ual harassment.215
D. Jennings v. University of North Carolina: Demonstrating the
Problem of Persistently Applying Title VII Precedent to Title IX
Cases
The most recent example of a court’s use of Title VII cases in
analyzing a sexual harassment claim by a student-athlete against a
coach is Jennings v. University of North Carolina.216  The history of the
Jennings case demonstrates the inadequacy of applying Title VII prece-
dent in the Title IX context and the confusion that this approach has
caused in the courts.  In Jennings, a former student and soccer player
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill brought suit against
the university and her soccer coach, Anson Dorrance, among others,
alleging that the coach had created a hostile environment by continu-
ally inquiring into and discussing the sexual activities of the team
members and by making remarks that were sexually charged.217  Jen-
nings was seventeen years old when she began playing for coach Dor-
rance, while Dorrance was forty-five.218
Jennings alleged that Dorrance would probe girls about their sex-
ual activities and often make objectifying remarks about players’ bod-
ies.219  According to Debbie Keller, one of Jennings’s teammates,
during daily warm-up sessions before practice, some women spoke
freely about their personal lives, including sexual activities.220  Amy
213. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999)
(quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)).
214. See, e.g., Crandell v. N.Y. York Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 319
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that whether each of the plaintiffs’ allegations alone created a
hostile environment under Title IX was irrelevant because the allegations had to be viewed
in the aggregate).
215. See, e.g., Hayut, 352 F.3d at 746 (noting that “‘appalling conduct alleged in prior
cases should not be taken to mark the boundary of what is actionable’” (quoting Whidbee
v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2000))).
216. 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
217. Id. at 691.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 259–60 (4th Cir. 2006) (panel decision).
Every day, before the formal start of practice, the team would engage in casual warm-up
sessions where team members would stretch and often talk and joke amongst themselves
about various subjects besides soccer. Id.
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Steelman, another member of the team, stated that Dorrance took
part in “‘sexual discussions, sexual jokes, sexual talk, sexual banter,
and sexual innuendos,’” with the players during these sessions.221
Jennings claimed that almost every day Dorrance would ask one player
questions such as “ ‘who [her] fuck of the minute is, fuck of the hour
is, fuck of the week [is],’ whether there was ‘a guy [she] ha[dn’t]
fucked yet,’ or whether she ‘got the guys’ names as they came to the
door or . . . just took a number.’”222  He asked another player whether
she planned “‘to have sex with the entire lacrosse team,’” and told a
third player “‘to keep [her] knees together . . . you can’t make it so
easy for them.’”223  He also told some girls that they had “‘nice legs’”
and “‘nice rack[s],’” and made references to their “ ‘bouncing’”
breasts and “‘top heav[iness].’”224  To one player named Charlotte,
Dorrance questioned whether she liked men and often referred to
her as “Chuck” because he thought that she was a lesbian.225  Jennings
also once overheard Dorrance fantasizing with the team’s trainer
about participating in an “‘Asian threesome’” with the team’s Asian
members.226
Although Jennings admitted that Dorrance never spoke inappro-
priately about her body, Jennings alleged two instances when her per-
sonal life became the topic of discussion during practice.227  On one
occasion during her sophomore year, Dorrance had asked one of Jen-
nings’s teammates whether the teammate had a “‘shag fest’” while
visiting with her boyfriend over the weekend, after which both Dor-
rance and the teammate asked Jennings about Jennings’s personal ac-
tivities during a weekend visit with her boyfriend.228  On another
occasion, Dorrance was present when one of Jennings’s teammates
teased her about whether Jennings was dating a particular boy.229
221. Id. at 260.
222. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 691 (en banc) (alteration in original).
223. Id. at 691–92. Dorrance also allegedly asked yet another player whether she in-
tended to have a “‘shag fest’” with her boyfriend and if she was “‘going to fuck him and
leave him.’” Id. at 692.  To a fifth player, Dorrance specifically asked about the size of her
boyfriend’s genitalia. Id.
224. Id. at 692 (alteration in original).
225. Id. Dorrance also said to Debbie Keller that he would “‘die to be a fly on the wall’”
when her roommate, also a teammate, first had sex because he believed her roommate to
be “‘a very sexual person by nature.’” Id.
226. Id.
227. Jennings, 444 F.3d at 261 (panel decision).
228. Id.
229. Id. According to Jennings, this incident took place during a stretching session
before practice. Id.  When Jennings answered that the boy was just a friend, the teammate
teased her and said that she saw Jennings hug him.  Id. Although Dorrance was present,
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In the fall of her first year at the school, Jennings met with Susan
Ehringhaus, the university’s legal counsel and Assistant to the Chan-
cellor, to voice her discomfort with Dorrance’s comments and behav-
ior.230  During the meeting, Jennings made a number of complaints,
including the allegation that Dorrance made sexual comments during
practice.231  However, Ehringhaus dismissed Jennings’s concerns and
told her to “‘work it out’” with Dorrance directly.232
Despite this meeting, Dorrance’s conduct continued and ex-
tended beyond the practice field.233  On one particular instance, in a
one-on-one player meeting in Dorrance’s hotel room, he prodded
Jennings personally about her sex life.234  While the soccer team was
in California for the national championship tournament, Dorrance
allegedly held one-on-one player evaluation meetings with each of the
players, including Jennings, in his hotel room.235  During their meet-
ing, Dorrance informed Jennings that she needed to improve her
grades or she could lose her athletic eligibility.236  Jennings claimed
that during this discussion, Dorrance asked, “ ‘Who are you fucking?’”
and if such behavior was hurting her grades.237  Jennings replied that
her personal life was “‘[n]one of his God damn business.’”238
Eventually, Dorrance cut Jennings from the team, allegedly be-
cause of “inadequate fitness.”239  Thereafter, Jennings’s parents com-
plained to Ehringhaus about Dorrance’s personal questions and
sexual comments directed at the players.240  In a letter to Ehringhaus
by Jennings’s father, Mr. Jennings expressed that he found it “ex-
tremely disturbing and completely inappropriate” for a university staff
member to address such comments and questions to any university
student or athlete.241  In accordance with the university’s sexual har-
Jennings could not remember if he said anything during this particular exchange. Id. at
261–62.
230. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 693–94 (en banc).
231. Jennings, 444 F.3d at 262 (panel decision).  During her meeting with Ehringhaus,
Jennings discussed how Dorrance continually discussed the sex lives of the players and that
his conduct made her feel humiliated and uncomfortable. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 694 (en
banc).  Jennings never said that Dorrance’s sexual comments were aimed at her. Jennings,
444 F.3d at 262 (panel decision).
232. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 694 (en banc).
233. Id. at 693–94, 700.
234. Id. at 693; Jennings, 444 F.3d at 262 (panel decision).
235. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 693 (en banc).
236. Id.
237. Id.; Jennings, 444 F.3d at 263 (panel decision).
238. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 693 (en banc) (alteration in original).
239. Id. at 694.
240. Id.; Jennings, 444 F.3d at 264 (panel decision).
241. Jennings, 444 F.3d at 264 (panel decision).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-3\MLR304.txt unknown Seq: 28 28-APR-08 7:22
2008] SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EDUCATION AND ATHLETICS 699
assment policy, the Director of Athletics, Richard Baddour, conducted
an administrative review, which Dorrance participated in.242  Al-
though Dorrance acknowledged taking part in group discussions at
practice concerning the athletes’ sexual activities, Dorrance alleged
that his comments were made in jest.243  After the review, Baddour
wrote a letter to Jennings’s father, which Dorrance endorsed.244  In
the letter, Baddour apologized for Dorrance’s actions and acknowl-
edged that, although Dorrance did not intend for his comments to be
offensive, Dorrance’s actions were inappropriate and that Dorrance
would immediately stop this activity.245
Unsatisfied with the school’s response, Jennings brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Caro-
lina against the university, Dorrance, and various university officials,
including Ehringhaus.246  Although Jennings brought this suit in Au-
gust 1998,247 the case was not settled until January 2008,248 and there
was considerable disagreement among the judges in the district court
and in the Fourth Circuit as to whether Dorrance’s conduct satisfied
the “severe or pervasive” test.249  Specifically, in the original district
court case, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants,
holding that although Dorrance’s conduct was “inappropriate in some
respects,” the conduct “was not ‘severe, pervasive and objectively of-
fensive’” such that it denied Jennings educational opportunities.250
In reaching this conclusion, the district court noted that “[c]ourts
242. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 694 (en banc).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.; Jennings, 444 F.3d at 265 (panel decision).
246. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 694 (en banc); Jennings, 444 F.3d at 265–66 (panel decision).
Originally, both Jennings and her teammate Debbie Keller brought suit. Jennings, 482 F.3d
at 694 (en banc).  After the district court partially granted the university’s motion to dis-
miss, the following claims remained: (1) a Title IX claim against the school; (2) claims for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dorrance for invading the plaintiffs’ privacy, Dor-
rance and Palladino (the assistant coach) for sexual harassment, and against various uni-
versity officials for failing to supervise Dorrance and Palladino so as to prevent the alleged
conduct; and (3) a claim for common law invasion of privacy under North Carolina law
against Dorrance. Jennings, 444 F.3d at 259, 265–66 (panel decision).  Ultimately, Keller
settled her suit with the defendants and her claims were dismissed with prejudice. Jennings,
482 F.3d at 694 (en banc).
247. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 694 (en banc).
248. Stancill, supra note 29. R
249. Compare, e.g., Jennings, 482 F.3d at 695 (en banc) (“[Dorrance’s] conduct went far
beyond simple teasing and qualified as sexual harassment.”), with Jennings, 444 F.3d at 275
(panel decision) (“[N]o reasonable jury could find that Dorrance’s remarks during Jen-
nings’[s] two-year tenure on the team were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a sexu-
ally hostile educational environment.”).
250. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 340 F. Supp. 2d 666, 675 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
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have looked to case law for Title VII . . . to establish what constitutes
discrimination based on sex under Title IX.”251  Using the factors
enunciated in Harris “as well as the ages of the harasser and the victim
and the number of individuals involved,” the court reasoned that Dor-
rance’s conduct was merely offensive.252  Citing Faragher, the court re-
iterated that such an approach was “‘sufficiently demanding to ensure
that Title VII [and by extension, Title IX] does not become a general
civility code . . . .  Properly applied, they will filter out complaints at-
tacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as sporadic
use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional
teasing.’”253
On appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.254  Relying predominately on Ti-
tle VII case law, the panel agreed that Dorrance’s conduct did not
constitute sexual harassment in violation of Title IX because he only
once directed his comments at Jennings and he “never touched, never
threatened, never ogled, and never propositioned” her.255  The court
stated that sexual harassment is sufficiently “severe or pervasive”
under Title VII if it amounts to “‘a change in the terms and condi-
tions of employment,’” making the workplace “‘hellish for wo-
men.’”256  Thus, the court maintained that only extreme conduct
would be actionable under Title VII.257
In applying this standard to Dorrance’s sexual banter during
practice, the court reasoned that such remarks were not focused on
Jennings and that, even if the comments were harassing, “ ‘second-
hand harassment’” was not as objectionable as harassment directed at
Jennings.258  Additionally, the court reasoned that Dorrance’s com-
ment regarding an “‘Asian threesome’” at most amounted to an “of-
fensive utterance” because it only occurred on one occasion and was
251. Id. at 673 (citation omitted).
252. Id. at 674–75.
253. Id. at 674 (alteration in original) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 788 (1988)).
254. Jennings, 444 F.3d at 259, 282 (panel decision).
255. Id. at 259, 269–72.
256. Id. at 269 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335
F.3d 325, 333 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).  In other words, according to the court, Title VII
requires that the work environment be “‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridi-
cule and insult’” to be sufficiently hostile. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21 (1993)).
257. Id. at 270.
258. Id. at 272 (quoting Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2005)).
The court also considered that many of Jennings’s teammates who took part in these con-
versations did not consider them offensive. Id. at 273.
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not directed at Jennings.259  With regard to the conduct that Dorrance
allegedly directed at Jennings, although the court acknowledged that
Dorrance’s question to Jennings in his hotel room about Jennings’s
sex life was certainly inappropriate, the court emphasized that Dor-
rance had not physically threatened or made a sexual proposition to
Jennings.260  The court ultimately found that the question was merely
an offensive utterance made in the context of a coach asking about a
student’s low grades and whether her social life had harmed her aca-
demic performance.261  The court also reasoned that Jennings’s
“forceful rejection” of Dorrance’s questioning suggested that neither
Dorrance’s age nor the power relationship between Dorrance and
Jennings made Dorrance’s inquiry sufficiently severe.262
Sitting en banc, however, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district
court’s decision granting summary judgment to the university on Jen-
nings’s Title IX claim, and remanded the case for trial.263  The Fourth
Circuit held that a jury could reasonably find Dorrance’s conduct to
be sufficiently “severe or pervasive” so as to create a hostile environ-
ment.264  In so finding, the Fourth Circuit emphasized Dorrance’s
control over the lives of the players, including over team membership,
positions, playing time, and scholarships, and how Dorrance used his
power to intrude into the sex lives of his players.265  Although Jen-
nings was only specifically targeted on a few occasions, the Fourth Cir-
cuit recognized that a reasonable jury could find these instances more
abusive given the overall, sexually charged environment that Dor-
rance had created.266  Unlike the Fourth Circuit panel, the Fourth
Circuit, en banc, found the conduct to be “degrading and persistent”
and that it caused discomfort, humiliation, fear, and dread among the
players.267
Jennings illustrates the difficulty courts have in determining what
constitutes sexual harassment and the inadequacy of persistently ap-
plying standards developed under Title VII to Title IX cases.  In each
of these decisions, the court’s reliance on Title VII case law to evaluate
Dorrance’s conduct obscured its reasoning and inhibited its ability to
contemplate circumstances unique to the educational, specifically, the
259. Id. at 273.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 273–74.
263. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 702 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
264. Id. at 696.
265. Id. at 696–97.
266. Id. at 698.
267. Id. at 697–98.
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student-athletic, environment.  Although the court’s reliance on Title
VII is consistent with precedent,268 the repeated influence of Title VII
case law on Title IX jurisprudence threatens to eclipse the effective-
ness of Title IX in confronting problems unique to the educational,
and, particularly, the student-athletic, environment.269  Rather than
repeatedly refer to case law that evolved to address problems in the
work environment, courts should develop factors and standards
uniquely designed for the educational context.
II. ANALYSIS OF TITLE IX AND THE ARGUMENT FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT STANDARDS
INDEPENDENT OF TITLE VII
Title IX warrants standards unique to the educational environ-
ment and distinct from the standards developed under Title VII for
three main reasons.  First, the language and purpose of Title IX impel
courts to be more proactive in identifying and preventing sexual har-
assment, and to establish standards designed specifically to protect
students.270  Second, Title IX’s proscriptions should be broader than
Title VII’s because, for a student to fully participate in and obtain the
benefits of education, a powerful trust must exist between the student
and the teacher, creating an imbalance of power that does not inher-
ently exist in the work environment.271  Third, Title IX’s reach is al-
ready limited by the Supreme Court’s holding in Gebser and,
therefore, a broader definition of sexual harassment under Title IX is
warranted and will not unreasonably expose educational institutions
to Title IX liability.272
Although Title VII may be helpful as a guide in analyzing Title IX
cases, the statutes were designed to apply to different social contexts,
and standards developed to protect the adult workplace are not ade-
268. See supra notes 73–215 and accompanying text. R
269. See Pinarski, supra note 16, at 924 (“A direct application of the ‘severe and perva- R
sive’ prong of Title VII into Title IX hostile athletic environment cases may fail to capture
the nuances that characterize the power dynamic between male coaches and female ath-
letes.”); see also Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title IX’s 25th Anniversary: Sex Discrimination in
the Gym and Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV. 545, 622 (1997) (discussing the distinctions be-
tween the Title VII environment and the Title IX environment and asking whether Title IX
should offer more protection to its “unique constituency”); Hogshead-Makar & Steinbach,
supra note 4, at 175 (noting that “the increased opportunity for harassment and an envi- R
ronment that makes some conduct less likely to be considered harassment—make close
consideration of the ‘constellation of . . . circumstances’ in intercollegiate athletics
essential”).
270. See infra Part II.A.
271. See infra Part II.B.
272. See infra Part II.C.
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quate to protect students in the educational environment.273  Thus,
rather than focus on Title VII case law to evaluate Title IX sexual har-
assment cases, courts should emphasize factors tailored to protect and
preserve the educational mission.274  Using such factors, courts could
begin to better evaluate conduct that occurs in the educational setting
and more effectively protect the unique relationships, including those
between coaches and athletes, that exist in schools.275
A. The Affirmative Language of Title IX and Its Overall Purpose to
Provide Gender Equality in Education Call for More Proactive
and Expansive Protections than Title VII Provides
Although Title VII’s ban on sex-based discrimination may not
have been “‘designed to purge the workplace of [all] vulgarity,’”276
and only applies to conduct that makes the workplace “‘hellish,’”277
the language and purpose of Title IX suggest that Title IX reaches a
broader range of vulgar conduct.  Specifically, to ensure equality in
education, Title IX affirmatively mandates that a person not be de-
nied “participation in” or the “benefits of” any educational program
or activity based on sex.278  This language is subtly different from Title
VII, which prohibits discrimination with respect to “compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or with respect to
“employment opportunities.”279  In using the language that it did in
273. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 551–52 (calling for a more stringent standard to be R
imposed on faculty-student behavior than on employer-employee behavior).
274. See infra Part II.D.
275. Although courts have previously taken the surrounding circumstances of each case
into account by applying a broad totality of the circumstances approach, see supra notes
211–215 and accompanying text, this unfocused approach is inadequate because it does R
not prioritize factors unique to the educational context.  The Jennings case used a totality of
the circumstances approach and, as demonstrated above in Part I.D, such an approach
proved unpredictable and difficult for courts to apply consistently. See Jennings v. Univ. of
N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 696 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (stating that courts look at all of the
circumstances to determine when harassment is sufficiently “severe or pervasive”); Jen-
nings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 267–70 (4th Cir. 2006) (panel decision) (same); Jen-
nings v. Univ. of N.C., 340 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (same).
276. Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 773 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Basker-
ville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)).
277. Greene v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting
Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430).
278. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .”).
279. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).  Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
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Title IX, Congress called on both educational institutions and courts
to take proactive steps in preventing sex discrimination, rather than
just prohibiting it.  Additionally, although the words “terms” and “con-
ditions” are given a broad construction under Title VII,280 Title IX’s
terms “participation” and “benefits of” are even more far-reaching be-
cause they are not tied to any specific aspects of education, but rather
encompass the entire educational experience.
Although this difference in language should not be overempha-
sized, it should be acknowledged and viewed within the overall con-
text of the purpose and focus of the two statutes.  Title IX was created
as part of a broader effort towards “achieving excellence and effi-
ciency” in education,281 which suggests that Title IX may reach a
broader range of conduct than Title VII.282  Whereas Title VII prohib-
its workplace discrimination based on a number of characteristics, of
which sex is only one, Title IX is uniquely focused on the issues of sex
and equality in education283 and, therefore, its interpretation should
be so tailored.284  Therefore, not only does the language of Title IX
dictate more proactive and extensive protection than Title VII pro-
vides,285 but its overall purpose in seeking gender equality in educa-
tion does as well.
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
280. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
281. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-554, at 247 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462,
2586–87 (suggesting that the Education Amendments were designed to meet this
purpose).
282. Cf. 118 CONG. REC. 5806–07 (1972) (Senator Bayh characterizing Title IX as “a
strong and comprehensive measure” that he found necessary “to provide women with solid
legal protection as they seek education and training for later careers,” and adding that it
was “designed to expand some of our basic civil rights and labor laws to prohibit the dis-
crimination against women which has been so thoroughly documented”).
283. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
284. Cf. Foote & Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 32, at 6–7 (noting that Title VII “was R
implemented mainly to address racial discrimination in the workplace, and ironically, the
inclusion of sex as a protected category on the basis of which discrimination was outlawed
was a political strategy designed to prevent the act’s passage” (emphasis omitted)).
285. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 1001 (2001) (asking whether “Title
IX’s affirmative language envision[s] sex equality rights more expansive than those encom-
passed by simpler antidiscrimination prohibitions like Title VII”); cf. North Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (“There is no doubt that ‘if we are to give [Title IX]
the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966))).
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The importance of education and the unique and vital role it
plays in society are well established and bolster the argument that Ti-
tle IX should be specifically tailored to meet the above goals.  The
benefits of education range from giving students the opportunity to
develop skills needed for a lucrative professional future,286 to instilling
the social and civic values necessary for a democratic society.287  A col-
lege education is critical to an individual’s career success and eco-
nomic security.288  According to the College Board, college graduates
earn over sixty percent more in wages than high school graduates.289
Similarly, the more educated a person is, the less likely he or she is to
experience poverty and unemployment.290
Moreover, education functions as the conduit through which so-
ciety instills its values and mores into its citizens.291  Evidence suggests
that the more educated a person is, the more likely he or she is to
vote, engage in volunteer work, give blood, and lead a healthy life
overall.292  For these reasons, psychologists and progressive educators
assert that education goes beyond teaching students to read and write
to encompass “preparation for living, life adjustment and conse-
quently such things as ethics, human relationships, producing, con-
suming and civic responsibility.”293
Colleges are important “in influencing the attitudes and behav-
iors of young adults,” and that time in a student’s life is a “defining
experience.”294  A college campus may at once function as a place of
education, a workplace, and a living space.295  Moreover, the “college
experience” is often highly influential in forming young people’s per-
286. See SANDY BAUM & JENNIFER MA, EDUCATION PAYS: THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCA-
TION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 8–16 (2007), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/
prod_about/news_info/cbsenior/yr2007/ed-pays-2007.pdf (detailing how average earn-
ings levels increase with higher levels of education).
287. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (stating that public schools “incul-
cat[e] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system”).
288. Barbara O’Connor, Foreword to HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at iii.  Barbara R
O’Connor, President of the AAUW Educational Foundation, avers that “[w]ithout a col-
lege degree, women earn substantially less pay, receive far fewer employer benefits, and are
less likely to be financially independent.” Id.
289. BAUM & MA, supra note 286, at 8. R
290. Id.
291. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that education is so
essential in preparing individuals for their “most basic public responsibilities” that “[i]t is
the very foundation of good citizenship”).
292. BAUM & MA, supra note 286, at 8.  In addition, the children of more highly edu- R
cated adults “have higher cognitive skills and engage in more extracurricular, cultural,
athletic, and religious activities than other children.” Id.
293. Charles A. Bucher, Athletics in Education, 28 J. EDUC. SOC. 241, 242 (1955).
294. Barbara O’Connor, Foreword to HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at iii. R
295. HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at 27. R
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ceptions about sexual conduct and what is appropriate.296  Therefore,
creating an environment in colleges and universities that is free from
sexual harassment is of profound importance, and these institutions
should be leaders in promoting “respectful and appropriate sexual be-
havior that does not interfere with other students’ educational
experiences.”297
Sexually harassing conduct should also be more closely moni-
tored in schools because of the profound effect it can have on stu-
dents.  While acts of sexual harassment are often similar, regardless of
the social context in which they take place, the injury to students, who
have impressionable and vulnerable minds, is specific to the educa-
tional environment.298  For example, although the effects of sexual
harassment are diverse, some common effects include feeling uncom-
fortable, embarrassed, violated, distracted, angry, less confident,
afraid, confused, helpless, or disappointed.299  Whether the student
reacts by having trouble sleeping, not participating in classes, avoiding
his or her harassers, avoiding particular buildings or places, or chang-
ing schools,300 sexual harassment negatively affects the student’s par-
ticipation in and denies the student the benefits of his or her
educational experience.301  In addition to the harm it causes individu-
als, an educational environment tarnished with sexual harassment can
have detrimental implications for society as a whole, “as graduating
students bring their attitudes about sexual harassment into the work-
place and beyond.”302  Ultimately, sexual harassment in schools poi-
sons the educational environment and can destroy the educational
mission.
Courts have recognized the vital importance of education in
other contexts as well, and have cautioned against the use of standards
296. Id. at 36.
297. Id.
298. See MACKINNON, supra note 285, at 1001. R
299. HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at 27–30, 32.  When thinking about gender equality, it is R
also noteworthy that female students are more likely to experience these feelings as a result
of harassment. Id. at 28.
300. Id. at 28, 31–32.
301. See MACKINNON, supra note 285, at 1007 (discussing the harm of unwanted sexual R
attention to individual students and to the entire academic community, and noting that an
individual might “‘submit to unwanted sexual attention at the price of debilitating per-
sonal anguish or may withdraw from a course or position and thus be forced to change
plans for a life’s work’” (quoting Senate Committee on Faculty Affairs, Univ. of Minn.,
Policy Statement on Sexual Harassment (Apr. 16, 1981))).
302. HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at 4. R
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developed in the adult context to evaluate conduct in schools.303  For
example, the Supreme Court has emphasized the “‘special character-
istics of the school environment’” in the student speech context.304
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,305 the Supreme Court empha-
sized the vital role that education plays in our society, and gave
schools more latitude to limit First Amendment free speech rights
than is allowed outside of the school environment.306  The Court un-
derscored the public school’s role in instilling the core values of soci-
ety and reasoned that schools “teach by example the shared values of
a civilized social order” and “teach[ ] students the boundaries of so-
cially appropriate behavior.”307  In addition, the Court noted that
“teachers . . . demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and
political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of
class.”308  The Court also distinguished the educational environment
from situations involving adults.309  In doing so, the Court recognized
the school’s interest in limiting lewd and offensive speech, reasoning
that it “could well be seriously damaging to its less mature
audience.”310
If student speech rights must be tailored to accommodate the dis-
tinct characteristics of the educational environment and to protect
students from exposure to lewd and offensive behavior, so too should
school officials be held to a higher standard in governing their own
conduct and the conduct of their employees.  Thus, the Court’s recog-
nition of a different constitutional standard for evaluating First
Amendment speech claims in the educational environment supports
303. See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n.11 (5th Cir.
1996) (explaining that “importing a theory of discrimination from the adult employment
context into a situation involving children is highly problematic”).
304. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 682 (1986) (noting that the First Amendment standards that apply to adults do not
necessarily also apply to children in public schools).
305. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
306. Id. at 681–84.
307. Id. at 681, 683.
308. Id. at 683.
309. See id. at 682 (asserting that the constitutional rights of children in schools are not
“coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”).  The Court further stated that
while the First Amendment affords broad protection to adult public discourse, the same
freedom does not extend to children in public schools.  Id.
310. Id. at 683; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“A
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mis-
sion,’ even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.”
(quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685)).
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the notion that schools are highly distinct from the adult work
environment.
For all of the above reasons, courts should be wary of reflexively
applying Title VII standards to Title IX sexual harassment cases.  To
ensure that no student is denied, on the basis of sex, participation in
or the benefits of education, Title IX warrants broader, more proac-
tive protections that take into consideration the distinctive aspects of
the educational environment.
B. The Educational Environment Warrants a Broader Definition of
Sexual Harassment than the Work Environment Because of the
Inherent Trust and Imbalance of Power Between Teachers
and Students
Title IX also warrants broader protections from sexual harass-
ment than those required under Title VII because of the importance
of trust between students and teachers.  To be effective in carrying out
the educational mission, an educational program requires close, but
nondiscriminatory and non-abusive, personal interaction between stu-
dents and faculty members.311  Although a non-hostile environment is
important in the employment context, it is essential in the academic
context because students develop an “inherent trust in and depen-
dence upon professors” that is critical to their education.312  Because
of the unique trust placed in teachers by students, some commenta-
tors have suggested that the teacher-student relationship resembles a
fiduciary relationship, like the therapist-client relationship, particu-
larly in one-on-one situations.313  In a fiduciary relationship, the two
parties proceed on unequal terms and the fiduciary must, therefore,
conduct him or herself with the highest level of good faith and only
for the other party’s benefit.314  When the boundaries of the student-
teacher relationship are violated, its “integrity and effectiveness” suf-
fer, hampering the student’s personal and professional develop-
ment.315  This intrinsic trust between students and members of a
school’s faculty and administration does not exist between adults in
the employment context.316
311. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 534, 551. R
312. Id. at 551–52.
313. S. Michael Plaut, Boundary Issues in Teacher-Student Relationships, 19 J. SEX & MARITAL
THERAPY 210, 213 (1993).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 216.
316. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 551 (noting that “[t]he student-faculty relationship R
encompasses a trust and dependency that does not inherently exist between parties in-
volved in a sexual harassment claim under Title VII”).
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In addition to the trust between a teacher and a student, there is
an inherent imbalance of power in educational environments that
does not always exist in employment settings.317  Teachers have obvi-
ous formal powers over students, such as control over “grades, sum-
mer opportunities, research positions, fellowships, and access to
information and other scholars.”318  However, educators also exercise
a more intrinsic power, which derives from their role as “mentors and
nurturers of young minds.”319  This imbalance of power is critical to
assessing harassing behavior because, as many commentators suggest,
sexual harassment is much more about power and control than it is
about sex.320  One of the major characteristics that distinguishes sexu-
ally harassing conduct from conduct that is merely inappropriate or
obnoxious is that sexual harassment often “occurs in the context of a
power imbalance.”321  This imbalance is especially acute in schools,
where students may be particularly vulnerable.322
Moreover, given this imbalance of power, students are more likely
to acquiesce to improper behavior on the part of a teacher out of fear
that the harasser may retaliate or that nobody would believe the story
if the student reported it.323  The Supreme Court recognized the chal-
317. See id. at 551–52.
318. SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS, FACULTY, AND STU-
DENTS 7 (Bernice R. Sandler & Robert J. Shoop eds., 1997) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT ON CAMPUS].
319. Thomas M. Melsheimer et al., The Law of Sexual Harassment on Campus: A Work in
Progress, 13 REV. LITIG. 529, 554 (1994); see also Letter from Dean Henry Rosovsky to the
Harvard Faculty (April 1983), in JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A VIEW FROM THE STANDS 125
(Andrea D. Williams ed., 1986) [hereinafter Letter from Dean Rosovsky] (“Implicit in the
idea of professionalism is the recognition by those in positions of authority that in their
relationships with students there is always an element of power.”).
320. See, e.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS, supra note 318, at 7 (“Most people think R
sexual harassment is simply about sex, when in truth, it has more to do with power than
with sex.”); Melsheimer et al., supra note 319, at 530–31 (linking the imbalance of power in R
the student-teacher relationship to the problem of sexual harassment).
321. SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS, supra note 318, at 7. R
322. See MACKINNON, supra note 285, at 1005 (“Sexual harassment of students by teach- R
ers arguably derives much of its ability to injure from power and authority that teachers
hold and exercise as teachers, including their access to vulnerable students whose receptiv-
ity and openness makes learning possible.”).
323. See Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 749 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Given the power
disparity between teacher and student[,] a factfinder could reasonably conclude that a
student-victim’s inaction, or counter-intuitive reaction, does not reflect the true impact of
objectionable conduct.”); Crandell v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304,
306 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Plaintiff’s failure to notify defendants of her problems as they oc-
curred . . . may well have been a product of concern about the effect of such complaints on
her grades and career prospects.”); Morrison v. N. Essex Cmty. Coll., 780 N.E.2d 132, 137
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that students acquiesced to sexual abuse by their coach to
whom they felt “beholden” for scholarships and playing time); Holly Hogan, What Athletic
Departments Must Know About Title IX and Sexual Harassment, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 317,
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lenges a student may face in reporting sexual harassment when, in
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,324 it stated that adult employ-
ees, such as teachers and coaches, are often best positioned to protect
students’ rights because they can, more easily than students, identify
discrimination and notify administrators.325  Because students are in
this vulnerable position vis-a`-vis their teachers, teachers have a height-
ened duty “not to abuse, nor to seem to abuse, the power with which
they are entrusted.”326
Equal access to participation in, and the benefits of, education
are precisely what Title IX protects.327  An environment that is soured
by sexually offensive behavior can inhibit a student’s ability to partici-
pate equally and benefit fully from his or her educational program.328
The relationship that students have with their teachers and mentors
has been characterized as the epitome of the educational experi-
ence.329  One study found that graduate students view their relation-
ships with faculty members “as the single most important aspect of the
quality of their graduate experience.”330  In educating a student of a
particular profession, a teacher takes on a variety of roles, including:
(1) a teacher of skills and ideas; (2) a sponsor of the student’s admis-
sion into and development within the profession; (3) a guide into the
“values, customs, resources and cast of characters” important in the
profession; (4) an exemplar; (5) a counselor; (6) an evaluator of the
349 (2006) (explaining that a student may submit to harassment from a teacher in a posi-
tion of authority, fearing retaliation from the teacher or that no one will believe the stu-
dent); Schneider, supra note 9, at 528 (noting that “students may fear that [an] institution R
will deny the validity or seriousness of a student[’s] complaint against a faculty member”).
324. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
325. Id. at 181.  In support of the notion that teachers and coaches may more easily be
able to identify sexually harassing conduct than students, see Morrison, 780 N.E.2d at 137,
where college athletes feared testifying against their coach because they believed their ac-
quiescence to his sexual abuse was consensual.  In that opinion, the court reasoned that
the students may not have immediately recognized the significance of the sexually discrimi-
nating conduct. Morrison, 780 N.E.2d at 142.
326. Letter from Dean Rosovsky, supra note 319, at 125. R
327. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633
(1999) (holding that sexual harassment is actionable under Title IX when “it effectively
bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit”).
328. See Doe v. Green, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1038 (D. Nev. 2004) (noting that a student
who was sexually abused by a teacher “ha[d] been denied the security that is fundamental
to accessing the institution’s resources and opportunities”); Schneider, supra note 9, at 551 R
(“A sexually abusive environment inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed student from devel-
oping her full intellectual potential and receiving the most from the academic program.”).
329. See Plaut, supra note 313, at 210 (“A good mentoring relationship can be what is R
sometimes called a ‘peak experience’ for both mentor and student—a sharing of some-
thing unique that no one else may experience in quite the same way.”).
330. Robert R. Bargar & Jane Mayo-Chamberlain, Advisor and Advisee Issues in Doctoral
Education, 54 J. HIGHER EDUC. 407, 407 (1983).
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student’s work and development; and (7) a believer in the student’s
ability to grow and flourish in the profession.331  Where a teacher sex-
ually harasses a student, the student loses the value of all of these ben-
efits.332  Likewise, when a coach harasses one of his athletes, the
athlete loses the benefits associated with the coach-athlete relation-
ship and the benefits of participating in the athletic activity.
The importance of trust and the intrinsic imbalance of power in
the student-teacher relationship demands that sexually offensive con-
duct in the academic setting be more carefully scrutinized and cir-
cumscribed than in the employment context.333  Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Gebser noted the “extraordinary harm” that a student must
endure when he or she is sexually harassed by a teacher, and reasoned
that such conduct “undermines the basic purposes of the educational
system.”334  As such, conduct that may be merely offensive in an adult
employment context may well constitute actionable harassment at
school.  For example, if a teacher engaged in conduct comparable to
that in Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Co.,335 such as entering a
student bathroom and pretending to lock the door, positioning a
magnifying glass over a student’s crotch and exclaiming “Where is it?,”
or engaging in a discussion in front of students about surviving a
plane crash using another person’s genitalia to breathe through, such
conduct seems much closer to hostile and abusive, than merely offen-
sive.336  This would be true even if the comments were sexually neutral
or ambiguous and the teacher never made any overt propositions to
students.  Thus, whereas Title VII is designed to provide a remedy
only when a workplace is made “hellish,”337 courts must analyze the
characteristics of the educational environment specifically to deter-
331. See Plaut, supra note 313, at 214. R
332. See id. at 216–17 (discussing the negative effects on students when teachers violate
boundaries).
333. Schneider, supra note 9, at 551–52; see also Heckman, supra note 269, at 622 (argu- R
ing that while reliance on Title VII is proper in the employment context, Title IX should
offer more protection because of “its unique constituency”).
334. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998); see also Doe v.
Green, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1038 (D. Nev. 2004) (stating that “the Supreme Court un-
doubtedly refer[red] to the immense trust placed in school employees to keep students
safe and to maintain an environment and relationship conducive to learning” when mak-
ing the statement above).
335. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
336. See id. at 747, 754 (determining that the conduct described above did not create a
hostile environment).
337. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. R
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mine the broader range of abusive behavior against which Title IX is
meant to guard.338
C. Allowing Title IX to Proscribe a Broader Range of Conduct Would
Not Subject Educational Institutions to Undue Liability as
Their Exposure to Liability Is Already Limited Under
Gebser
Because courts do not hold educational institutions liable on an
agency basis, but only for showing deliberate indifference to known
harassment,339 adopting a broader construction of Title IX would not
overly burden schools with unfair liability.  Instead, it would require
educational institutions to respond to conduct that is less severe than
required under Title VII, but that may, nevertheless, reasonably be
perceived as harassing to students.340  The Supreme Court has made
clear that an educational institution may be liable under Title IX only
for the institution’s own acts and not under agency principles and, as
such, an educational institution must know about the harassment and
must have “an opportunity to rectify any violation.”341  If the educa-
tional institution responds adequately to the harassment, the institu-
tion will not be held liable.342  Thus, the institution itself will not be
held liable unless it had notice and its response was “clearly unreason-
able.”343  This built-in limitation curtails the reach of Title IX and
allows Title IX to cover a broader range of abusive activity without
unduly exposing educational institutions to Title IX liability.344
338. See Pinarski, supra note 16, at 945 (arguing that the courts must recognize “the R
nuances of the context of the athletic environment so that seemingly benign behavior is
not summarily dismissed as coaching technique . . . if the promise of Title IX equality is
ever to be fulfilled”).
339. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288–90.
340. See infra Part II.D (listing factors to consider when making this determination
under Title IX).
341. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288–90.
342. Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 41 (1st Cir. 1999).
343. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648–49
(1999).
344. This restriction distinguishes Title IX cases from Title VII cases, where the analysis
focuses more on the employee’s conduct than on the employer’s response, and an em-
ployer’s lack of notice of the conduct is not dispositive. See supra note 66 and accompany- R
ing text.
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D. Rather than Rely on Title VII Case Law to Assess Conduct and
Determine Liability, Courts Should Focus on Factors Tailored to
Protect the Educational Environment
When assessing whether conduct is “severe or pervasive” enough
to warrant Title IX liability, courts should not look primarily to Title
VII standards for analogies and comparisons, but should emphasize
factors uniquely tailored to ensure equality in education.  Specifically,
the courts should look to factors that take into account the unique
importance of education and the inherent trust and power imbal-
ances between educators and students.  Thus, in addition to the Harris
factors described above, which act as a general guide when assessing
sexual harassment,345 courts should consider more specifically tai-
lored factors.  In particular, courts should take into account: (1) the
educational setting in which the harassment took place;346 (2) the na-
ture of the relationship between the harasser and the harassed, in-
cluding the imbalance of power and the educational purpose of the
relationship;347 and (3) the existence of adequate safeguards and poli-
cies to prevent such harassment, and the reasonableness of the educa-
tional institution’s response in preventing or remedying conduct of
which it knew or should have known.348  An example of how a court
should apply these factors, in the context of Jennings, is offered
below.349
1. Educational Setting of Harassment
The first factor courts should consider is the educational setting
in which the harassment occurred.  Specifically, courts should assess
the educational purpose of the activity and overall value that the activ-
ity has in the student’s education.  This factor takes into consideration
the variety of activities, events, and social contexts that occur within
the educational environment and during which harassment can take
place.350  For example, harassment may occur in the classroom, in the
345. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. R
346. See infra Part II.D.1.
347. See infra Part II.D.2.
348. See infra Part II.D.3.
349. See infra Part II.D.4.
350. It is important to consider each of these contexts given that with the enactment of
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Title IX’s coverage extends, with certain excep-
tions for religiously affiliated entities, to “all of the operations of . . . (A) a college, univer-
sity, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education; or (B) a
local educational agency . . . , system of vocational education, or other school system” if the
institution receives federal funding.  Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
259, § 3, 102 Stat. 28, 28–29 (1988) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000)).
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hallways, in a clinical program, during an extracurricular activity, in
an athletic program, on school trips, during school-related functions,
and so forth.351  The effect on a student’s ability to participate in or
benefit from an educational experience will vary depending on the
setting in which the harassment took place.352  For instance, sexual
misconduct in a one-on-one tutorial session by a teacher with whom a
student has a class, or a one-on-one training session by a coach, is
likely to cause greater detriment than harassment by a school em-
ployee during a school-related social activity or in the cafeteria, at
least where physical violence is not involved.  Whereas sexual harass-
ment in the classroom or in the locker room more directly affects the
educational “benefit” the student receives, harassment outside of
these environments will usually more indirectly affect the student’s ed-
ucational experience.  This factor, therefore, will allow courts to bet-
ter evaluate the harm to the student’s educational experience and the
possible denial of educational participation and benefits.
2. Relationship Between Harasser and Harassed
The second factor, intertwined with the first, focuses on the na-
ture of the relationship between the harasser and harassed.353  In as-
sessing this factor, courts should look at the relative ages of the
harasser and the harassed,354 whether the relationship is one of
teacher-student, coach-student, administrator-student, or school em-
ployee-student,355 as well as how directly that individual is involved in
the education of the student.  Courts should also consider the level of
school at which the harassment took place, elementary through post-
graduate secondary education, because it affects the power imbalance
between the student and the adult harasser.  This factor is important
because the level of dependency and trust between the student and
351. See, e.g., HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at 2 (“Sexual harassment occurs nearly every-
where on campus, including student housing and classrooms.”).
352. Cf. MACKINNON, supra note 285, at 1005 (“One cannot receive equal benefit of an R
education while coping with rape or threat of rape in school, or participate equally in class
while running a gauntlet of physical or verbal sexual assault and denigration, or learn
effectively in a context of insecurity and disrespect because of one’s sex.”).
353. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999)
(“The relationship between the harasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent to
which the misconduct can be said to breach Title IX’s guarantee of equal access to educa-
tional benefits and to have a systemic effect on a program or activity.”).
354. Id. at 651.
355. Cf. HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at 21 (noting that harassment on college campuses R
may come from a variety of people, including professors, resident advisers, security guards,
coaches, counselors, or deans).
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teacher will vary depending on the nature of the relationship.356
Whereas a higher level of dependency and trust will exist between a
student and teacher in a one-on-one mentoring relationship, the level
of dependency and trust will be much lower between a student and a
school employee with whom the student has no direct educational re-
lationship.357  Additionally, a teacher or a coach who functions as an
evaluator will generally exert a greater power over a student than an
employee or an administrator who does not directly evaluate the stu-
dent’s work or performance.358  Thus, determining the nature of the
relationship between the harasser and student is vital in assessing sex-
ual harassment in education because of the role that dependence,
trust, and power play in sexual harassment.359
3. Institutional Response to Harassing Conduct
The third factor focuses on the safeguards that a school estab-
lishes to protect students from sexual harassment and the school’s re-
sponse to sexually harassing conduct.  Although courts ordinarily
examine a school’s response upon notification of harassment as a sep-
arate element of a Title IX hostile environment claim,360 the school’s
response or failure to respond is also relevant in determining the hos-
tility of the environment that the student endured.361  Specifically, the
failure to respond or provide adequate outlets for those who are ex-
periencing some form of harassment can seriously aggravate the
harm.362  Many students suffering as a result of sexual harassment may
be as hurt by the failure of the school to respond appropriately as by
the actual harassment.363  The harm caused by institutional indiffer-
ence is also salient because of the difficulties students face in report-
356. Plaut, supra note 313, at 214. R
357. Id. (noting that “the need for both closeness and boundaries are at their greatest”
in one-on-one mentoring relationships); cf. HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at 21 (pointing out
that sexual harassment by faculty can be particularly upsetting for students due to faculty
members’ power and authority).
358. Cf. SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS, supra note 318, at 7 (“The formal power of a R
supervisor or a faculty member is obvious, both have the power to affect the life chances of
employees and students because of their ability to provide or withhold a benefit, evalua-
tion, or service, and their potential to do harm.”).
359. See supra note 320 and accompanying text. R
360. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. R
361. See MACKINNON, supra note 285, at 1004–05 (noting that “sexual harassment in R
school, combined with the failure of schools to respond to it adequately, can have a devas-
tating and traumatic effect on the educational opportunities and emotional development
of girls and young women”).
362. Id. at 1005.
363. Id.
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ing harassment.364  In a recent report, the AAUW stated that less than
ten percent of college students who are harassed report the incidents
to an employee of the college or university for various reasons, includ-
ing “skepticism that anyone can or will help, and not knowing whom
to contact at the school.”365  The AAUW added that many women ex-
perience “nervousness or discomfort” in reporting conduct because
they fear it “might not be ‘a big enough deal.’”366  As a result of insti-
tutional indifference or unresponsiveness, students will continue to
experience hostile educational environments, which cause them to
consider changing schools, not attend school, not participate in class
or, as a more extreme alternative way of dealing with harassment,
think about or attempt suicide.367  Therefore, the educational institu-
tion’s response is pertinent in determining the severity of sexual con-
duct and whether a hostile environment exists.368
4. Analyzing Jennings v. University of North Carolina Using the
Three Proposed Factors
As previously explained, Jennings v. University of North Carolina369
demonstrates the difficulty courts have in defining sexual harassment
and the problem with relying too heavily on Title VII case law.370  The
Fourth Circuit could more effectively have analyzed Dorrance’s con-
duct by explicitly setting forth and using the three factors outlined
above.  If the court had done so, it would have concluded that partici-
pating in the UNC women’s soccer program was fundamental to Jen-
nings’s educational experience;371 that Dorrance unfairly capitalized
on the power that he held over his players;372 and that UNC’s inade-
quate response to Jennings’s complaint intensified the hostility of the
environment that she experienced.373  By expressly enunciating and
evaluating these factors, as well as the pervasiveness of Dorrance’s con-
duct, the court would have more soundly analyzed Jennings’s Title IX
364. See supra notes 323–325 and accompanying text. R
365. See HILL & SILVA, supra note 2, at 4.  Over one-third of students do not reveal inci-
dents of sexually harassing conduct to anyone. Id.
366. Id. at 32.
367. MACKINNON, supra note 285, at 1004–05. R
368. While courts must still scrutinize the institution’s response when determining
whether to impute liability to the institution, to ensure that victims of sexual harassment
reach the imputation stage of the analysis, courts should also consider it when evaluating
the severity of the conduct.
369. 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
370. See supra Part I.D.
371. See infra Part II.D.4.a.
372. See infra Part II.D.4.b.
373. See infra Part II.D.4.c.
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claim to determine that a reasonable jury could have found a Title IX
violation based on sex.374
a. The Educational Setting: College Athletics
The alleged harassment in Jennings occurred within the context
of the women’s soccer program at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.375  Athletics have for many years played an important
role in education.376  Athletics afford those students who participate
an opportunity to develop “physical, mental-emotional, and social val-
ues” that contribute to the students’ overall educational experi-
ence.377  Although an athletic program may sometimes appropriately
be characterized as “extracurricular,” in other circumstances, where
the program is highly intensive and competitive and requires a sub-
stantial personal commitment of time and effort, the program may be
characterized as more fundamental to the educational experience.
When the activity rises to such a high level of importance in the stu-
dent’s overall educational experience, courts should more carefully
scrutinize the alleged sexual misconduct.
In Jennings’s case, the level of personal commitment required of
her and the substantial role that soccer played in her college life sug-
gests that the activity was fundamental to her educational experience.
Jennings participated in a soccer program that has been labeled “the
country’s most successful women’s soccer program at the college
level.”378  The UNC soccer team has won the most national champion-
ships in the history of women’s college soccer and, therefore, young
women with extraordinary soccer skills yearn for a spot on the
team.379  Jennings began participating in the soccer program at the
outset of her first year of college in August 1996, and continued
through May 1998, when she was cut at the end of her sophomore
year.380  During soccer season, which was during the fall, Jennings was
required to be at practice every weekday afternoon and on Saturday
mornings, except on game days.381  Given the high degree of perform-
ance and dedication required to compete at this level and the amount
374. See infra notes 375–429 and accompanying text. R
375. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 691 (en banc).
376. See Bucher, supra note 293, at 242 (suggesting that athletics are “an important and R
integral part of the whole educational process”).
377. Id.
378. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 691 (en banc).
379. Id.
380. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 283 (4th Cir. 2006) (panel decision)
(Michael, J., dissenting).
381. Id. at 259 (majority opinion).
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of personal commitment Jennings had to make, it is not unreasonable
to conclude that the activity was central to Jennings’s education.  As
such, and given the pervasiveness of Dorrance’s sexual comments,382
it is clear that Jennings at least raised a triable issue of fact as to
whether a hostile environment existed that inhibited her from reap-
ing the full benefits of the soccer program.
b. Nature of the Relationship: Coach-Student
Sexual harassment of female athletes by male coaches is a signifi-
cant and frequent problem in student athletics.383  Many attribute this
phenomenon to the unique and close-knit relationship between
coaches and athletes.384  Coaches and athletes spend large amounts of
time together both on and off the field, often traveling overnight for
games.385  Coaches see athletes’ vulnerabilities “at inopportune and
essential competitive moments.”386  In addition, the nature of sports is
physical and there is a great deal of attention placed on the athletes’
bodies.387
As with teachers in the classroom, coaches generally hold a signif-
icant amount of power over their athletes.388  The nature of that
power is quite different from the power a supervisor would have over
an employee at work.389  Coaches control the athletes’ access to schol-
382. Debbie Keller alleged that Dorrance would make inappropriate comments “‘any-
time the team was together,’ whether ‘on a plane, in a car, or on a bus, in a hotel, at
practice, out of town, [or] at events.’” Id. at 283 (Michael, J., dissenting).
383. See Heckman, supra note 269, at 624–25 (noting that the news had been “replete” R
with allegations of sexual harassment by male coaches of their female student athletes);
Hogan, supra note 323, at 317 (stating that athletic departments may be involved more R
often in sexual harassment cases than any other department on campus, aside from those
that manage discipline or provide resources to victims of sexual assault); Jesse Mendelson,
Note, Sexual Harassment in Intercollegiate Athletics by Male Coaches of Female Athletes: What It Is,
What It Means for the Future, and What the NCAA Should Do, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 597, 616
& n.183 (2003) (pointing out the rising trend of sexual harassment cases in women’s sports
over the last ten years).
384. See Filip Bondy, When Coaches Cross the Line, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1993, § 8, at 1 (ex-
plaining that “sports psychologists are beginning to understand that there is a unique rela-
tionship between the male coach and the young female athlete, and that the delicate
balance can sometimes tilt the wrong way”).
385. See Hogshead-Makar & Steinbach, supra note 4, at 176 (noting that coaches and R
athletes can spend more than one-third of their waking hours together and that the fre-
quent opportunity for one-on-one contact heightens the risk of sexual impropriety).
386. Pinarski, supra note 16, at 922. R
387. Hogshead-Makar & Steinbach, supra note 4, at 177–79. R
388. See id. at 175 (discussing the “immense authority” that coaches typically exercise
over athletes).
389. See Erika Tripp, Comment, Sexual Harassment in Sports: How “Adequate” Is Title IX?,
14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 233, 246–47 (2003) (distinguishing the nature of control exer-
cised by a coach over a student-athlete from that of a supervisor over an employee based on
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arships, playing time, playing positions, leadership opportunities, and
some social relationships.390  In addition, coaches are frequently more
involved in other private realms of their athletes’ lives, including their
health, weight, training, curfew, sexual activity, and social lives.391
Typically, the supervisor and the employee are both adults, and the
supervisor’s authority over the employee lasts only during business
hours.392  However, with coaches and student-athletes, there is often a
difference in age and a more natural imbalance of power.393
The close, intimate relationship between coaches and athletes in-
creases the potential for abuse and makes the line between appropri-
ate and inappropriate behavior less susceptible to precise definition
than in a teacher-student or supervisor-employee relationship.394  As
such, the coach-athlete environment is prone to even more subtle
abuses and violations of sexual integrity than in many other con-
texts.395  On the other hand, the physical nature of the coach-athlete
relationship may require a court to tolerate conduct that may be more
offensive in other situations.396  A coach may assume a number of
roles in relation to the student, including “teacher, mentor, cheer-
leader, friend, advisor, and confidante” and, therefore, may appropri-
ately engage in behavior that would be inappropriate in certain Title
VII contexts.397  Thus, a court must tailor its analysis of whether con-
duct is harassing or appropriate to the unique circumstances of such a
relationship, and cannot merely look to Title VII case law for an
analogue.
The coach-student relationship between Jennings and Dorrance
contained elements of trust and dependency, which Dorrance violated
by his conduct.  Jennings’s relationship with coach Dorrance began
the times when a coach or supervisor may control an athlete or employee, the ages of the
individuals involved, and the levels of trust and dependence at stake).
390. Hogshead-Makar & Steinbach, supra note 4, at 175. R
391. Pinarski, supra note 16, at 922. R
392. Tripp, supra note 389, at 247; see also Heckman, supra note 269, at 622 (noting that, R
in the employment context, individuals are usually adults on “equal planes”).
393. See Tripp, supra note 389, at 247. R
394. Pinarski, supra note 16, at 922. R
395. See id. at 916–17 (arguing for a broader definition of sexual harassment in athletics
that considers a coach’s “imposition of sexual stereotypes or sexual shame” on an athlete).
396. See Hogshead-Makar & Steinbach, supra note 4, at 177 (explaining that coaches and R
athletes may come into physical conduct when a coach demonstrates techniques, offers
congratulations, or assists with stretching, although such conduct would be improper in
almost every classroom setting).
397. See Pinarski, supra note 16, at 923–24 (cautioning, nevertheless, that the coach- R
athlete relationship may be “potentially more psychologically exploitative than an em-
ployer-employee relationship”).
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when Dorrance personally recruited her during high school.398  When
Jennings began playing for Dorrance, Jennings was seventeen years
old and Dorrance was forty-five.399  Some consider Dorrance “one of
the greatest Division I coaches in history,” believing “[n]o one has
done more to shape U.S. women’s soccer than Dorrance,” and some
of his players look to him with trust and admiration.400  As for his
players’ thoughts, Tiffany Roberts, a former member of the UNC wo-
men’s soccer team, has stated that “ ‘[h]e knows how women work, the
way we think.’”401  Lauren Gregg, former assistant coach for the U.S.
women’s national team and also a former UNC player, has said “‘[h]e
taps into the core of your being.’”402  Another former player for Dor-
rance described Dorrance’s style of coaching and relationship with his
players as “ ‘cultivat[ing] an environment where the players become
dependent on him. . . .  I got convinced that he was the only one who
could coach me.  It’s a drug that you’re on.’”403  Dorrance himself has
emphasized the importance of a coach caring for the athletes and
making a personal connection with them, not merely coaching
them.404  As such, he encouraged players to speak in confidence with
him about their personal lives, and claimed that he wanted to be like a
father to them.405
By persistently meddling into and commenting about the players’
sex lives, and by continually making sexually charged comments, Dor-
rance degraded his players and violated their dependency and
trust.406  Whereas a coach should use the coach-student relationship
to help the players improve their skills and foster their development,
Dorrance used his closeness with his players to “bombard[ ] [them]
with crude questions” and to make remarks about the bodies of his
players that “portrayed them as sexual objects.”407  As a result, rather
than enjoying the benefit of the UNC soccer program and realizing
her potential as an athlete, Jennings was left feeling “‘uncomfortable,
filthy and humiliated’” and in “constant fear” of becoming the subject
398. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
399. Id.
400. S.L. Price, Anson Dorrance, The Legendary North Carolina Women’s Soccer Coach, Is Sure
He Understands What Makes a Female Athlete Tick, and He Has 15 National Titles to Prove It.  So
Why Are Two Former Tar Heels Suing Him for Sexual Harassment?, SPORTS ILLUS., Dec. 7, 1998,
at 86, 88–89.
401. Id. at 88.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 102.
404. Id. at 89.
405. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 696–97 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
406. Id. at 697–98.
407. Id. at 691.
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of Dorrance’s comments.408  Jennings was not alone in feeling this way
and she witnessed other players cry or react to Dorrance’s behavior
with other expressions of sadness or revulsion.409  Amy Steelman, an-
other member of the team, was apparently “ ‘very uncomfortable with
[the] sexually charged environment’ that Dorrance had ‘created and
encouraged,’” and often left practice crying.410  Debbie Keller, Jen-
nings’s initial co-plaintiff, stated that Dorrance’s conduct “‘made
[her] skin crawl’ and made her ‘fe[el] dirty.’”411  This evidence fur-
ther suggests that Dorrance’s conduct created a hostile environment
for Jennings, which impaired her ability to participate and deprived
her of an educational benefit.
Dorrance also exercised substantial power over Jennings, which
Dorrance took advantage of by his alleged conduct.  As the most suc-
cessful coach in women’s college soccer, Dorrance had a great deal of
control over a player’s prospects in the world of women’s soccer.412
At UNC, for example, Dorrance controlled a player’s “team member-
ship, position, playing time, and scholarship eligibility.”413  Jennings
claimed that “ ‘[g]irls would cut off their right arm’” to play for Dor-
rance.414  One of Dorrance’s former players described him as “‘a very
powerful man, and charismatic—and you’re under his spell.’”415  Dor-
rance used his power over the players to make them submit to his
sexual comments and questioning.416  Debbie Keller claimed that she
endured Dorrance’s conduct because she feared losing playing
time.417  Jennings claimed that Dorrance’s conduct put the players
“‘between a rock and a hard place.’”418  In Jennings’s case, the most
potent manifestation of Dorrance’s abuse of power came during his
one-on-one player interview with her in his hotel room.419  In describ-
ing this occurrence, Jennings stated, “ ‘I was 17 when he asked me
[Who are you fucking?] in a dark hotel room, knee-to-knee, bed not
408. Id. at 693.
409. Id.
410. Id. (alteration in original).
411. Id. (alteration in original).
412. Id. at 696.
413. Id. at 697.
414. Id. at 696 (alteration in original).
415. Price, supra note 400, at 102.  The player added, “‘You fall out of that spell when R
maturity sets in, when you get out in the world, where the answers aren’t spoon-fed to
you.’” Id.
416. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697 (en banc).
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. See id. (describing this scene and noting that it caused Jennings to acutely experi-
ence “the extra pressure of [the] age difference” between she and Dorrance).
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made, sitting at one of those tiny tables.’”420  Dorrance clearly abused
his power by coercing Jennings into a sexually charged environment
that made her uncomfortable and that she felt obliged to endure in
order to participate in and receive the benefits of the soccer program.
c. The Institution’s Response
Finally, UNC’s tepid response to Jennings’s complaints about
Dorrance’s behavior exacerbated the already precarious situation and
amplified the hostility of the environment that Jennings was forced to
endure.  When Jennings reported Dorrance’s conduct to Susan
Ehringhaus, an official at UNC designated to field sexual harassment
complaints, Ehringhaus dismissed Jennings’s complaints instead of as-
sisting Jennings in coping with the uncomfortable environment she
faced.421  Ehringhaus stated that Dorrance was a “‘great guy’” and
that Jennings should speak with Dorrance directly about her
problems.422  As a result of Ehringhaus’s inaction, Dorrance’s conduct
continued and Jennings had to cope with it on her own, without ade-
quate assistance from the school.423
UNC’s failure to respond adequately was even more damaging
given the difficulty Jennings must have faced in deciding to report the
conduct.424  As described above, the abundance of power that Dor-
rance exercised over his players, and the many different facets of that
power, made it more likely that his athletes would acquiesce to inap-
propriate behavior.425  Additionally, the fear of being a social outcast
or a bad teammate can contribute to an athlete’s proclivity to acqui-
esce to sexual advances, as well as a hesitancy to report such inci-
dents.426  The fact that Jennings and Keller were subjected to
resentment and hostility from other players and students at UNC after
news of the lawsuit broke427 provides evidence of Dorrance’s influ-
ence and the difficulty Jennings faced in reporting Dorrance’s con-
420. Id. (alteration in original).
421. Id. at 700.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 700–01.
424. See supra notes 364–366 and accompanying text. R
425. See Morrison v. N. Essex Cmty. Coll., 780 N.E.2d 132, 137 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002)
(noting that players felt “beholden” to a coach who sexually harassed and abused them
because of the coach’s ability to obtain scholarships for them and to control playing time);
Mendelson, supra note 383, at 600 (commenting on the great courage necessary for ath- R
letes to report harassment and that athletes may blindly follow their coaches’ desires).
426. See Price, supra note 400, at 91, 93 (discussing the negative response by teammates R
and former players to Jennings’s and Keller’s suit against Dorrance).
427. Id. at 93. Players on the team when the suit was filed reportedly characterized it as
“‘a betrayal’ and ‘an attack on the program.’” Id.
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duct.  On one occasion, one of the team’s former players allegedly
swore at and threatened Jennings after seeing her on campus.428  Ad-
ditionally, given Dorrance’s popularity on campus and the reputation
of the soccer program, the UNC community generally seemed to treat
Jennings and Keller as the “villain[s]” for bringing the lawsuit, as op-
posed to criticizing Dorrance for his alleged conduct.429  The diffi-
culty of Jennings’s decision to report Dorrance’s conduct, combined
with the university’s inaction in responding to it, therefore, exacer-
bated the hostility of the environment that Jennings had to endure
and the harm to her educational experience.  In sum, assuming Jen-
nings’s allegations are true, these factors, combined with the perva-
siveness of Dorrance’s sexual comments, make it reasonable to
conclude that Dorrance’s conduct prevented Jennings from fully par-
ticipating in and benefiting from her soccer program and collegiate
experience, in violation of Title IX.
III. CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, in protecting students from sexual harassment, has been inhib-
ited by the courts’ reflexive use of case law from Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act to analyze the severity and pervasiveness of sexually inap-
propriate conduct.  This approach is inadequate for three reasons.
First, the affirmative and more expansive language of Title IX suggests
that both schools and courts should take a more proactive approach
in identifying and prohibiting sexually harassing conduct than Title
VII’s general prohibition of discrimination does, particularly in view
of Title IX’s goal of providing equality in education for both sexes.430
Second, Title IX warrants a broader proscription of sexual miscon-
duct than Title VII because of the trust and natural imbalance of
power that exists in the teacher-student relationship.431  Third, be-
cause liability under Title IX for sexual harassment committed by an
428. Id.
429. See id.
In Chapel Hill[,] there’s little doubt who is regarded as the villain.  Chancellor
Michael Hooker, who is a defendant in the suit along with AD Baddour, still
shows up at most soccer games with his wife, Carmen.  On Nov. 14, after Parlow
scored a goal early in the second half of the Tar Heels’[s] 6-0 home win over
UNC Charlotte, sports information codirector Dave Lohse announced to the
crowd that Parlow had passed Keller on the Tar Heels’[s] alltime scoring list.
“The place went nuts,” Lohse says.  “It was deafening compared to when we
scored—the biggest cheer of the day.”
Id.
430. See supra Part II.A.
431. See supra Part II.B.
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employee may only be imputed to an educational institution based on
the institution’s own acts and not under agency principles, Title IX
can cover a wider range of activity without overly exposing educational
institutions to liability.432
Rather than structure their analyses of Title IX hostile environ-
ment cases around fact patterns arising in the work environment,
courts should analyze factors uniquely designed for the complexities
and subtleties of the educational environment.433  These factors
should include the educational setting in which the harassment oc-
curred, the nature of the relationship between the harasser and the
harassed, and both the safeguards established by the institution to
protect students from harassment and the adequacy of the response
by the institution once it receives notice of the harassment.434  Appli-
cation of these factors to the Jennings case reveals how they work and
interact and how they can assist a court in evaluating sexual miscon-
duct in schools.435
By focusing on such factors, the courts will develop a more suita-
ble body of Title IX case law, uncontaminated by a jurisprudence that
developed in an entirely different social context.  Commentators have
suggested that a lack of Title IX sexual harassment case law is the rea-
son for the courts’ persistent reliance on Title VII.436  This dearth will
continue, however, and no meaningful Title IX jurisprudence will de-
velop until courts stop relying so heavily on Title VII case law and start
developing standards and factors to consider specifically when analyz-
ing Title IX claims.
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432. See supra Part II.C.
433. See supra Part II.D.
434. See supra Part II.D.1–3.
435. See supra Part II.D.4.
436. See, e.g., Julie Carroll Fay, Note, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District:
Is It Really the Final Word on School Liability for Teacher-to-Student Sexual Harassment?, 31 CONN.
L. REV. 1485, 1496 (1999) (“Because of the dearth of sexual harassment claims under Title
IX, Title IX case law has borrowed heavily from Title VII principles in developing a model
for sexual harassment claims.”).
